

opportunity to further develop guidelines and principles for the involvement of the United Nations in verification.

Clearly the process of UN peace operations has many linkages to arms control verification and confidence-building measures. Like arms control and non-proliferation agreements, peace operations often include actions resulting in disarmament. In particular, peacekeeping operations have been mandated to perform a number of disarmament-related tasks, such as the verification of agreements on the control and non-resupply of weapons and the non-return of foreign forces, as in Cambodia, or the supervision of heavy weapons restrictions and no-fly zones, as in the former Yugoslavia. In the Golan Heights, El Salvador and Angola, among many sites, UN peacekeepers have learned the mechanics of conducting weapons inspections, monitoring troop withdrawals and monitoring disengagement zones. In addition, in order to identify crises in a timely fashion, the UN is currently exploring the development and use of region-specific confidence-building measures to be used as a conflict prevention approach in unstable areas.

Peace operations not only have benefited from lessons learned in the development of arms control verification and confidence-building measures, but they in turn benefit those processes. To verify Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council established UNSCOM, which drew heavily on the United Nations Secretariat as well as member states for its staff. In the nuclear area, UNSCOM shares the functions of monitoring compliance and the destruction or removal of proscribed material with the IAEA. The UNSCOM verification package capitalizes on synergies associated with the combination of many methods: space imagery from NTM and commercial satellites; aerial imagery at both high and medium/low altitude; on-site inspections of declared and undeclared sites; ground imagery associated with helicopters and inspectors; and NIM, including information from defectors and from collateral sources.

The UNSCOM experience is an example in which lessons learned by UN-mandated disarmament inspections have developed methodologies that will be useful in the context of conflict prevention and peacekeeping; these lessons in "coercive" or "mandated" verification will also be of importance in developing non-coercive verification regimes for multilateral arms control agreements such as the BTWC in which there will be the potential for non-compliant states parties. The development of techniques to dispose of arms and to detect and remove land mines is another example of cross-fertilization between technologies for arms control verification and post-conflict peace-building.

Peace operations, most especially those associated with preventive diplomacy, like arms control and confidence-building agreements, require enhanced access to information about deployments of military forces, arms and equipment and about the intentions of states parties—in short, transparency. Multiple independent sources of information, operating synergistically, make transparency more convincing.

