

Such advantages have certain costs, however, some of which have been noted already. The assurances given by an international agency may be less credible than those of a bilateral system, precisely because the latter could be more demanding. The agency's system would reflect an international consensus that amounts to an acceptable common denominator, one which may involve sacrificing some effectiveness. The international agency will probably not adopt overtly discriminatory criteria in assessing risk of potential violations, and thus there might be a mismatch between the distribution of the safeguards burden and the distribution of the political risk. While suppliers might view its safeguards as a floor, recipients might view them as a ceiling. In addition, updating the system to adapt it to changing needs, technology (including safeguards technology) and perceptions of the problem could be difficult in an international organization, since the members must agree to these updates. If the agency's verification system were specified in some detail in a convention, the problems of modifications, reservations and limited acceptance of amendments would have to be faced. These would be particularly pressing in a dynamic industry or if the convention's coverage was meant to be extended to additional agents and precursors, or if additional safeguarding approaches became necessary or desirable.

Such difficulties could create pressures for the generation of more safeguards systems, within the organization or outside it. Maintaining the coherence of the organization's system and the centrality of the organization in the overall verification regime could thus be long-term problems. Assuming that the chemical weapons treaty had a disarmament aspect, however, as well as a non-proliferation aspect, one problem faced by the NPT safeguards system would be avoided: the existence of two classes of safeguarded states under the convention, those with the weapons and those without.

### **Relations with Other International Organizations**

More than one international body may have verification functions in the same issue area. The IAEA has faced this situation particularly with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which performs verification functions, among other tasks, among the states of the European Community. The Agency has a co-ordinating agreement on verification with EURATOM, but the relationship has been a sore point not only with the states of Eastern Europe (which have objected to "self-inspection" in the negotiation of the NPT) but also with EURATOM and the European Community states themselves. Since its verification role is one of the few areas in which it has retained a significant function, EURATOM has been reluctant to surrender this task to the IAEA. The working out of an arrangement between the two bodies has created some difficulties as well because of differences in the nature of their safeguards systems and in their powers. The negotiation of a co-ordinating agreement to preserve EURATOM's function and serve the IAEA's NPT purposes, yet try to avoid unacceptable duplication, delayed the ratification of the NPT by