

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This proposal is countered by the idea of the permanent presence of international inspectors at the destruction facilities. The Soviet side has carefully listened to the arguments in favour of such approach and conducted a number of bilateral and multilateral consultations on this subject. In particular, last January there was useful exchange of opinions with the group of delegations of non-aligned States.

Further study of the question, and the consultations, have shown that systematic international on-site verifications of the destruction of stocks at a special facility on a quota basis represent a sufficiently effective verification instrument and that other delegations' understanding of this fact is increasing. They have also led us to the conclusion that in respect to some chemicals the verifications could be more strict. In the final analysis, the Soviet delegation, displaying its desire to achieve progress as rapidly as possible in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in an effort to unravel one of the most complicated and important most issues at the negotiations, and once again demonstrating its real rather than feigned interest in progress at the negotiations, declares the following.

It would be prepared, during the elaboration of the procedures for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at a special facility, to agree to such a solution when the efficiency of the verification, from the beginning of the destruction process up to its completion, would be ensured by the permanent presence at the special facility of the representatives of international control, as well as by a combination of systematic international verifications at the facility, including also the storage of the stocks of weapons at it, with the use of instruments (gas chromatographs, dynamometric counters, measuring thermoelements, etc.).

The verifications in the depots at special facilities of the next batches of chemical weapons to be destroyed could be conducted together with the inspections at the special facility. We shall state in detail our view on the subject in due time in the subsidiary body of the Conference.

In declaring today our readiness in principle to consider in a positive manner the proposal for the permanent presence of the representatives of international control at the special facilities for the destruction of stocks, we would like particularly to stress that our premise is that our partners at negotiations will also for their part prove their readiness, not in words but in deeds, to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

Recently, references have frequently been made here at the Conference to a supposed presentation by the United States of a new document on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We shall, of course, study it as carefully as we have studied all other documents of the States participating in the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban. What is important, of course, is not the fact itself of the future presentation of the document, but its content. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will judge the seriousness of United States intentions as regards a chemical-weapons ban only by how it takes into account the position of other participants in the negotiations, in particular our position. We have heard more than enough of wishful thinking and generalities. We wait for reliable proof of goodwill and the desire to achieve an agreement. The existence of such a desire will determine success in the negotiations.