

The preparatory sessions for the Madrid Review Conference began on September 9, 1980. The NATO and the neutral and non-aligned countries all made it very clear that they wanted the first part of the Review Conference to be just that – a thorough review of Helsinki Final Act implementation. The review would be followed by the consideration of new proposals. The Soviets, on the other hand, wanted the briefest possible consideration of implementation performance (recalling only too well the harsh criticism they had received at Belgrade). They felt that the bulk of the Review Conference should be devoted to new proposals. Needless to say, these divergent perspectives produced a deadlock. A compromise solution developed by Sweden, Austria, Cyprus and Yugoslavia broke the deadlock. Although the conference was to entail a six-week review, the compromise allowed for the consideration of new proposals during the last two weeks. Of greater significance, the NNA compromise stipulated that the Review Conference would not adjourn until consensus was reached on the next follow-up session.

The Review Conference began on November 12, 1980, and was almost immediately engulfed in acrimonious exchanges. The focus was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the United States was determined to press its advantage on this issue. The Soviets insisted that the discussion was beyond the scope of the CSCE. Compounding the already bitter situation was the spectre of Soviet intervention in Poland.

In the course of the Review Conference, countless proposals were advanced outlining how the Helsinki proposals could be extended, improved or supplemented. The WTO advanced its proposal for a Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament in Europe and the French introduced a further refinement of their proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe. As the months slipped by there was gradual progress toward agreement on the terms of reference for a separate conference to deal with European security issues, one based largely on the French model. By mid-summer of 1981, there appeared to be agreement on many issues associated with the proposed conference. The participant States agreed that the conference should develop second generation Confidence-Building Measures that would be politically binding, militarily "signifi-

cant" and verifiable. *These second-generation CBMs, after a Yugoslavian suggestion, were to be called Confidence and Security Building Measures or CSBMs.* The principal outstanding conference issue remained a definition of geographic limits. Although the Soviets had agreed to consider CBMs that extended east to the Ural Mountains, they refused to specify what they meant by a corresponding and offsetting western geographic extension. When the Soviets finally did clarify their thinking on this issue, the resulting extension proved to be so ambiguous and potentially enormous that the Western negotiators flatly rejected it. The definition of geographic scope continued to be a contentious issue, primarily because it represented the cutting edge of much larger Eastern and Western foreign policy aims and concerns. The Soviets wanted to restrict American reinforcement capabilities and flexibility as much as possible by extending the CSBM zone as far to the West as it could. The Soviets also sought to achieve this goal by introducing naval and air CSBMs that would impair the American ability to reinforce Europe. The United States was just as determined to prevent this. Additionally, the Soviets wished to portray the United States as being obstructionist in developing reasonable arms control agreements in Europe, thereby driving another wedge between the Americans and their European NATO allies as well as increasing anti-American sentiments within European publics.

The Review Conference made very slow progress throughout the latter half of 1981 on both human rights issues and some of the CDE issues. In an effort to produce some genuine movement, a balanced draft concluding document was formulated by the neutral and non-aligned states but the almost simultaneous imposition of martial law in Poland effectively curtailed any hope of progress for some time. Relations were so poisoned by events in Poland that no substantive progress was possible for virtually one year. The only thing that kept the follow-up conference and the CSCE process alive was the unwillingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to accept the negative consequences of actually terminating the conference by walking out. In November of 1983, the NATO states presented amendments to the NNA states' draft of 1981. These amendments generally addressed human rights issues asso-

