

implication all the appropriate terms of the original agreement between the plaintiff and Vanderwater, and thus time became and was of the essence of the contract. In consideration of the \$1,000 paid to Smith for the defendant, the defendant undertook to hand over the conveyance already executed so as to permit Vanderwater's agreement with the plaintiff to be consummated in that way. As soon as the defendant refused to carry out this agreement, he was guilty of a breach of agreement, and the right of action in the plaintiff to recover back the \$1,000 paid as upon failure of consideration became vested in him.

The cases on which Mr. Watson relies are cases of a different type. Where a contract is to be performed in futuro, one party may, by announcing his intention not to carry out the contract when the time arrives, so repudiate the contract as to confer an immediate right of action upon the other. That other may treat the announcement of the intended breach as giving him a present cause of action, or he may, if he choose, wait to ascertain if default is really made. If he elects to take the latter course, it is open to the repudiating party to change his mind and withdraw his announcement of repudiation, and he is then at liberty to carry out his original contract. But nowhere can be found a case which suggests that an offer to perform after the time fixed constitutes a defence. It may be relied upon in mitigation of damages. It may afford some ground for application to the Court for equitable relief, but a tender of a deed on the 18th, when the contract calls for the completion of the sale on the 17th, is not a compliance with the obligation assumed.

This, I think, is the result of all the cases.

If this is to be regarded as an action for specific performance and an application to the Court for equitable relief from the default, then nothing has been shewn to justify interference. No explanation of the default is vouchsafed. A defence is filed in which charges of fraud are made, and not a scintilla of evidence has been given to support them. Everything indicates that the position in which the defendant finds himself is the unexpected result of a piece of sharp practice on his part.

With the rights as between the plaintiff and Vanderwater I am not here concerned, for he is no party to this litigation. I can see nothing which justifies the retention by the defendant of this \$1,000, for which he has given nothing.

Judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant Finkleman.