

him to the ground. He was conveyed back to his quarters at Victoria Barracks, Windsor, in a farmer's trap, which was hired for the purpose, and was immediately attended to by Surgeon-Capt. S. Powell, of the Grenadier Guards, who found that he was severely bruised, but was unable to say on his first examination what other injuries he had sustained.

THE WORK OF DEFENCE.

By a Commanding Officer.

I HAVE an excellent opinion of Dr. Borden, the new Minister, but I fear he is under the influence of the old ring, or he would never have authorized the recent order giving an unlimited brevet to the permanent corps. It was a great blunder, and will work terrible mischief. It draws the line too sharply, and builds up an impassable wall, on one side of it being, as an officer remarked a few days ago, "Honor and profit," and on the other, "Hard work, poor pay and slow promotion." Another captain quietly laughed and said, "It's queer encouragement." Here is a school corps, organized for teaching purposes only, getting everything. Here are we, the fighting force, getting bare toleration. It is a good example of the old game, "Heads we win, tails you lose."

As for the Commanding Officers' Association, I may tell you we tried that before—many years ago, it is true, but we had the backbone of the then active militia in it. We presented time and again our views and the result of our practical experience to the Department at Ottawa, but they were not even acknowledged, and the organization "petered out." To effect anything, an organization such as you speak of must have some authority for, and power behind it, and could then act as a sort of Defence Committee, whose recommendations the Government of the day would be bound to respect. As matters now are, the permanent corps, which I am happy to say I always opposed, are, as I said they would be, "the permanent partners," and the other fellows have little or nothing to say. My belief, founded on many years' experience and, if I do say it myself, pretty close observation, is: That we will never have an effective fighting force nor any simple, well-devised scheme of defence for Canada until both are organized and perfected by men who have learned their trade on the field and whose business is war and the preparation for it. For instance, the force for the relief of Chitral amounted to some 14,000 or 15,000 men. Where is the officer in Canada who could repeat the operation? Yet, if we had to fight, and by all accounts we were very near it this spring, we would have to place at least 100,000 men in the field. Where are they? Where are the guns, the cavalry, engineers, pontoon train, hospital, commissariat, service corps, etc.? And then, if we had all these, where are your leaders, general and generals?

THE PERMANENT CORPS AND SCHOOLS.

IN the article on this subject in the last issue the last paragraph should have read that a Board of Visitors should be appointed "from" not "for" the militia. Such a board would be incomplete without a representative from the permanent corps. Lieut.-Col. Otter, D.O.C., commanding No. 2 Depot, from his long and successful experience in both active and permanent units, would be indispensable. The suggestion has been very favorably received by officers in the permanent corps who have nothing to lose and much to gain by such an enquiry. A report from a committee composed of Lieut.-Cols. Otter, Drury, Davidson (48th Highlanders, Toronto), Starke (Victoria Rifles, Montreal), Telford (31st Grey Batt.), and up-to-date officers of this stamp in whom the force has perfect confidence, would be invaluable to the G.O.C. He would doubtless act on their recommendations. It is quite true in theory, as one correspondent suggests, that the G.O.C., himself, should deal with the question without the assistance of a board. But he is with

us only five years. It will probably take him that long to gain sufficient knowledge to enable him to decide what should be done. If he acts on the report of a board, they, and not he, will be criticised. The less opportunity the G.O.C. gives the country to find fault with him, the more able will he be to do effective work.

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"This naturally brings up the whole question of 'militia reform,' and a very large and important question, viz., the Imperial defence of the Empire, with the naval and military organizations fairly adjusted and distributed between the Mother Country and the colonies is the outcome. Whether, too, it would be more advantageous to pay £40,000 sterling per annum into the Imperial treasury in payment for a British regular regiment to be stationed in Canada, and abandon the present military schools of instruction is a question for the serious consideration of the Government, and there is always the danger that we might drift back to a system where dependence would be thrown upon the Imperial Government for the force needed to maintain law and order in Canada, and throw a great damper upon the necessity that now exists of keeping up a militia force of sufficient strength to aid in defending the country in times of need. We must not forget that when Great Britain withdrew her troops in 1871 colonial responsibility was recognized, and some progress has been made, and it might be well not to offer to the powers that be, any excuse to diminish the aid they have been compelled to extend to the militia. For all these reasons I have always opposed to the utmost of my power the idea of changing the original schools of instruction into regular regiments, which, with the very limited means at the disposal of Parliament, I hold to be beyond the ability of Canada to maintain in an efficient manner, with a high standard of excellence like the regiments of the British army, involving as it does such intricate questions as first appointments, promotion, retirement and pension, which the taxpayers are not willing to face. Any attempts therefore, to engraft a special class upon our democratic institutions must end in failure and humiliation to those who attempt it, and I consider it an act of common kindness to point out these facts to any general officer sent from England to command our militia."—Lieut.-Col. J. F. Turnbull, in Toronto Telegram.

MISTAKEN ECONOMY.

A COMMANDING officer, an enthusiastic rifle shot, writes to THE GAZETTE as follows:

"Our annual rifle matches took place much later this year on account of the Government grant not coming to hand, and when it did come it was \$50 instead of \$75. I do not know whether this is general or not, but it made us shape our cloth accordingly. It seemed strange to me that the annual grant should be decreased when the general opinion seems to favor increase."

Several complaints of similar cutting down of the grants to rifle associations have come to THE GAZETTE. That there is room for the exercise of economy in the administration of the militia is true enough; but such an action as that which has just been noticed is an excellent example of how not to go about the work of reform. These grants are seldom if ever misused, and from a very trifling expenditure excellent value is received in the way of increased efficiency with the weapon with which the militia is armed: the very thing at which military training should aim. If the Department wishes to rearrange the system upon which the grants are given, it might well be in the direction of encouraging a greater attendance upon the ranges, rather than in that of reducing the appropriations.

Our correspondent's complaint as to the slowness with which the reduced grant came does not stand alone, and in this also it seems that his ground is well taken. November is quite too late in the year for rifle shooting.