

a connection with the highest moral and religious interests, that it is indispensable to speak in terms which, without sufficient cause, might be open to the charge of irreverent familiarity). Must not God, then, know himself—it will be said—along with all that he knows? Undoubtedly, *in some sense*; but the question that must be determined before this admission can serve Professor Ferrier's purpose, is: In what sense? If God's knowledge of himself should be altogether of a different kind from our knowledge of ourselves—which I believe it to be—and which at all events, Professor Ferrier has not disproved—is it designating the divine knowledge and ours by one notion; is it reducing them under the dominion of a common law; is it laying a foundation for a series of propositions applicable to both alike: to tell us that God knows himself in all the acts of his understanding, and that we know ourselves in all the acts of our understanding? Let it be shewn that the word *know* means the same thing in both cases, and let its import be pointed out, and then Professor Ferrier will be in a position to commence his argument. He will have got a fixed nail on which to hang his chain.

In the following passage our author replies to the charge of presumption which he anticipates that some will bring against him for endeavoring to reduce all intelligence, whether divine or human, under the dominion of necessary laws. "It may seem to adopt a somewhat presumptuous line of exposition in undertaking to lay down the laws, not only of *our* thinking and knowing, but of *all* possible thinking and knowing. This charge is answered simply by the remark that it would be still more presumptuous to exclude any possible thinking, any possible knowing, any possible intelligence, from the operation of these laws—for the laws here referred to are necessary truths—their opposites involve contradictions and therefore the supposition that any intelligence can be exempt, from them is simply nonsense." And with reference to a supposed enquiry on the part of a reader, whether it might not have been sufficient to lay down the alleged necessary laws of cognition as absolutely authoritative over human intelligence only, he goes on to say; "Good reader, this is not sufficient. It is absolutely indispensable, (this must be confessed in the plainest terms)—it is absolutely indispensable for the salvation of our argument, from beginning to end, that these necessary laws should be fixed as authoritative, not over human reason only, but as binding on all possible intelligence. It is not possible, therefore, for the system to adopt any such suggestion as that thrown out. And if the reader had any further misgivings as to the propriety of our course, we would recommend