stantive law and to the ends of justice, is as much part of the law as the substantive law itself.'

Amendments, by the Legislature, from time to time, to the law have made escapes from substantial justice on mere technicality few and far between, if they ever need occur. And I may add that, as the provisions of the law exist for the purpose of making a case so plain that substantial justice can be done, how is it possible to assert that justice had been done when some of the means the Legislature has deemed necessary in reaching that end have been disregarded?''

REFUSAL OF ROYAL ASSENT TO BILLS.

The Home Rule question and the refusal of Ulster to leave the shelter of the Parliament of Great Britain and come under the powers of a provincial government which would necessarily be controlled by the Irish Nationalist party (we call them Fenians in this country since their attempt to control Canada in 1866) naturally suggests an enquiry as to the right of the King to refuse assent to the bill which has recently become law, subject to such assent. Whilst the King would have the legal right to refuse such assent, it is not likely that he would take such an unusual course. The law on the subject is thus referred to in Hansell's Precedents:—

''The refusal of the Royal Assent, though it is now almost a century since it has been exercised, is and always has been an inherent and constitutional prerogative of the Crown. It ought, however, to be exercised with great discretion, as the King is never supposed to act in his political capacity, but by the advice of counsellors. The refusing of the Royal Assent to a bill agreed upon and offered to the King by both Houses of Parliament is, in fact, preferring the advice of his Privy Council or of some other person to the advice of the Great Council of the Nation assembled in Parliament. There was a very long debate upon the refusal of King William [III.] of the Royal Assent to the bill 'touching free and impartial proceedings in Parlia-