

Yet we have, of course, engaged with others in boycotts, embargoes and such policies as, for example, prohibiting arms sales to either side in a troubled region and restricting sales of "strategic materials" to Communist states. In one case, Rhodesia, we have participated in a policy of full-fledged economic sanctions undertaken as a co-operative UN project. (A Canadian embargo is by itself unlikely to move any government.) The sanctions against Rhodesia did not bring swift results, though history may yet say they played a part in wearing down the Smith Government. On the whole, however, the record of economic sanctions is discouraging. If Canadian Governments are wary of them, they are motivated as much by doubts of their efficacy as by a desire to protect Canada's commercial interests. The benefits to Canada of a peaceful solution in southern Africa would be of so much greater value than the minor profits of our industry and commerce in that area that it is inconceivable any Canadian Government would refuse to support a program of economic sanctions that had a sound chance of achieving the desired result. In the meantime, we have also to take into consideration the argument that *apartheid* is more likely to be undermined by the need of the large corporations for skilled black labour than by the impoverishment of the whole country. That is not an unanswerable argument, but it has to be met.

The purpose here is not to suggest that the arguments for or against an economic boycott of countries that violate human rights are conclusive but that a calculation of tactics and a sense of proportion are required if the exorcism is to be more than a self-indulgent gesture. We must consider in each case whether sanctions are likely to work, whether they might do more harm than good, and whether such a blunt instrument is advisable in a world where offending régimes are much more plentiful than the UN agenda suggests. The Canadian Government is exhorted to cut off relations with one régime or another at least once a month.

These issues are confused by the realist argument that the national interest is such that we cannot afford a moral policy and by the moralist argument that expediency is by definition wicked. All foreign policy should be guided by moral principles but expediency is not necessarily wicked. The world has achieved a precarious state of co-existence within a UN system. Its essence is a recognition of mutual interest in restraining the forces of anarchy by whatever rules can be negotiated. Toleration of each other's domestic actions is essential to the system as it stands. Perceptions of misbehaviour vary dramatically, and are not exactly equitable. Can we afford to risk the precarious structure that keeps us from destruction by fomenting tensions over human rights beyond our reach? On the other hand will such inhumanity fester and explode if we ignore it? Clearly not even the extinction of *apartheid* in South Africa would justify setting off a nuclear war. But should we be frightened by such grandiose arguments into doing nothing? Should we not recognize that there are situations in which we dare not risk the consequences and others in which, if our calculations are precise, we can do something, or at least try?

These dilemmas have been revived by President Jimmy Carter with his appealing call for moral leadership after a murky decade. Henry Kissinger is not regarded as having been a moralist in foreign policy, but it should be

noted that his *Realpolitik* accomplished what professed moralists failed to achieve, the withdrawal of Americans from South Vietnam, the reversal of United States policy toward China, a more even hand in the Middle East and the critical breakthrough in Rhodesia. President Carter has revived faith in grassroots American decency, a quality that, though it lends itself easily to hypocrisy, is a virtue on which all of us rely. Carter's appeal is all the more attractive because it is touched by humility, a recognition that all peoples err, even God's chosen republic.

Not only Americans but their friends as well are attracted by the idea of reasserting those moral values Western countries have learned over centuries, which have been maligned by the Communists and by some leaders of the Third World. There is an argument for talking back, for defending principles that, at the very least, reflect the best of Western culture and, many believe, have a universal applicability — though none of us has, of course, been consistently faithful. Our Western economic system has had consequences not all of which are good, but it has displayed a greater capacity to adapt than have more ideological systems. The American message President Carter is reviving has been, and still is, grossly distorted in practice but, unlike Soviet political economy, it never ceases to be revolutionary. The danger comes from the crusaders whose eyes have seen the glory.

The President's intention is praiseworthy but the problems are immediate. What if the legitimate campaign for civil rights in the U.S.S.R. upsets the crucial negotiations for strategic arms limitation? The president made clear that he would go on with SALT regardless, but what if the atmosphere were too badly soured for negotiation and the Russian hardliners were encouraged? If the arms talks fail, shall we be into a new arms race, totally unrestrained by the ethics of mutual deterrence? Can we, on the other hand, ignore the cynical disregard by the Eastern European powers of the "Third Basket" of the Helsinki Agreement, in which they promised greater respect for human rights, and more particularly the greater freedom of movement of men and ideas by which alone Europe can be tranquillized?

Dare we by our silence imply that the use of psychiatry to punish and tame political dissidents is acceptable? Can we afford to abandon causes for which men in all countries have died, which could easily be lost in a world of peoples struggling desperately to exist? Are we so greatly intimidated by our guilt complexes and excessive fair-mindedness that we do not dare to be right in our Western tradition? Then there were the exceptions, as always, for nasty régimes that were nevertheless strategically vital, not just to the U.S.A. but to the maintenance of international balance and stability. Would human rights be better respected in South Korea if Kim II Sung took over? It is not easy to get the values straight.

Is the key to confidence to be found paradoxically in greater humility? Our own principles of law and government are based on the recognition that we are all sinners, that we need to discipline ourselves. We discuss internationally ways and means to deal with crimes that we all acknowledge to be a problem. Increasingly, countries are sharing experience with civil rights legislation. Every government — even our own, we recognize — is prone to disregard human rights, either by carelessness or because