

IV. Canadian Course in the Committee.

- (a) First possibility - that Canada should initiate or urge further sanctions.

In view of the Government's pronouncements and the obvious lack of any special interest or special power on Canada's part to warrant such a course, it may presumably be left aside.

- (b) Second possibility - to propose that further sanctions be not applied.

There would seem no special warrant for Canadian initiative in this direction either, unless the Canadian Government were convinced (1) that further sanctions would mean war, and (2) that unless Canada acts, no other country will take steps, in Committee or behind the scenes, to postpone action. If the preceding analysis is correct, and particularly in view of Eden's non-committal speech in the Commons on February 24 and Riddell's telegram of February 26, giving the Secretary-General's view that a further embargo will not be adopted by the Committee, it hardly seems necessary for Canada to step out in front. Such a course would hardly be consistent with our instructions to Pearson on December 11th, of which the United Kingdom was advised, "to inform the Committee that Canada is prepared to participate with other members of the League in the extension of the export embargo". The question did not come up, the statement was not made, and much water, or oil, has flowed under the bridge since, but some inconsistency would be involved. More important is the consideration that if the sanctions experiment fails,

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