

whom any portion of the powers of the state may be confided, would be immediately broken.

I conclude, therefore, that as in such a country as Canada there must exist a number of public officers, large in proportion to the present number and wealth of the inhabitants, so the selection of them must for the most part be entrusted to the head of the local government.

I disclaim, however, on the part of the Ministers of the Crown, every wish to urge these general principles beyond their just and necessary limits. There are cases in which I think, according to the analogy of similar cases in this country, the patronage now said to be exercised by the lieutenant-governor might with perfect safety and propriety be transferred to others. On this subject, however, it will be more convenient to state the general principle, than to attempt the specific and detailed application of it at this distance from the scene of action.

That principle is to maintain entire, by the nomination and removal of public officers, that system of subordination which should connect the head of the Government with every person through whose instrumentality he is to exercise the various delegated prerogatives of the Crown. What is necessary for this end must be retained; whatever patronage is unnecessary for the maintenance of this principle should be frankly and at once abandoned.

It is noticed in the report, as an aggravation of the evils of the government patronage, that almost every public officer holds his place at the pleasure of the Crown. I cannot disguise my opinion, that the public good would be little advanced if the subordinate functionaries held their places upon a more certain tenure. In practice, indeed, though subject to certain exceptions to be hereafter noticed, no public officer is in danger of losing his employment, except for misconduct or incompetency: but there are many kinds of misconduct and incompetency which could never be made the subject of judicial investigation, but which yet would be destructive of the usefulness of a public officer, and ought therefore to be followed by a dismissal from the public service. Nor is it necessary to insist at any length on the evils which would arise in the transaction of business, if the subordinate officers were aware that they were entirely independent of the good opinion of their superiors for continuance in their employments.

It is not difficult to show, in reference to any conceivable arrangement on the subject of patronage, that there will be dangers against which it is impossible to take an absolute and perfect security. I know not, however, that any less exceptionable scheme could be devised than that which at present prevails, of giving to the head of the local government the choice of the subordinate officers, and of making their places dependent on His Majesty's pleasure. To prevent, however, as far as may be possible, the continuance of any well-founded ground of complaint on this head, His Majesty, disclaiming for himself and for his representative in the province all desire to exercise, with the view merely to patronage, the power of appointing public officers, is pleased to prescribe for your guidance the following rules:

First: You will, at the earliest opportunity, enter into a diligent review of the offices in the appointment of the Crown and of the local government, as detailed in the report of the committee, and the appendix, with a view to ascertain to what extent they may, without impairing the efficiency of the public service, be reduced immediately and prospectively. You will report to me the result of your investigation, with such particular information as will enable His Majesty's Government to decide in each case on the expediency of adopting your recommendation.

Secondly: If, during the reference of that report to me, any occasion occur for the reduction of offices, either by abolition or by consolidation, you will exercise your own discretion as to waiting for fresh instructions, or proceeding at once to the reduction. Any appointment, however, made under such circumstances, will be merely provisional. In case of the immediate abolition of any office not required for the efficient discharge of the public service, you will stipulate for such a compensation to the present holders, as the disappointment of their reasonable expectations may entitle them to receive.

Thirdly: In the prescribed revision of these offices you will make it one of your objects to form a judgment what share of the patronage of the Crown or the local government may safely and wisely be transferred to other hands. You will report to me on this subject, but will refrain from taking any steps regarding it without further instructions from me.

Fourthly: In the selection of persons to execute public trusts, you will be guided