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*Le chargé d'affaires au Mexique  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in Mexico  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 479

Mexico City, November 19, 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

## OBSERVER STATUS FOR CANADA AT NEXT O.A.S. MEETING

Reference: Your despatch No. X-345, October 28, 1952, and our air telegram No. 14 of November 15, 1952.<sup>†</sup>

Since the Ambassador is at the General Assembly and will not return until after the next courier leaves on November 21, we suggested in our air telegram that you might get his personal views in New York. In the meantime, we offer an interim reply.

2. In the first place we have tried to look at the matter specifically from the local point of view of this Embassy. We find it hard to believe that O.A.S. membership could help us materially to get more information than we can get now (points 2 and 3 of the arguments for acceptance in the U.S. memorandum). There are no political problems between Mexico and Canada that membership would help solve. We think, on point 1, that our present good relations with Mexico already constitute an excellent background for the steadily increasing trade between the two countries. On point 4, so far as we know, Canada has participated only in meetings on technical subjects.

3. So far as Mexico is concerned, therefore, we can see no great advantage in closer approach to O.A.S. It is fair to add that neither do we see any real objection or disadvantage.

4. In the wider sphere, it seems to us that of the four U.S. arguments for acceptance, the one requiring serious study is the first. If we were to make a "gesture of goodwill" by accepting observer status at Caracas it is doubtless true that our gesture would be well received; in fact it might well cause a wave of enthusiasm. But underlying this, we suspect, would be the assumption that Canada was now well on the way in, and that her full membership would follow as a matter of course. What then would be the result when, or if, it should become apparent that Canada was not prepared to accept membership? So far as goodwill is concerned, would the reaction be strong enough to leave in the end a minus rather than a plus result? Or, if our Canadian attitude and our reasons for hesitation were tactfully and skillfully explained would the Latin-Americans be content to accept the half loaf and have us in there as perennial observers, while still cherishing the hope that we would some day be members? (Once we accept observer status at Caracas I do not see how we can then draw back to our present aloofness; we are going to be observers from there on into the indefinite future, or until we accept membership.)