

Hon. Mr. DANDURAND—Yes, I will come to that. If the hon. gentleman will read that speech which I read this afternoon in toto—that is the speech of the 26th March—he will find the Right Hon. Winston Churchill stated that if those ships were not provided for, although they were not needed for Great Britain, they would be needed for the general welfare of the empire; but I will come to that point in a moment. He was reckoning on the offer of the prime ministers of Canada to give them three ships. He was disposing of them. He wanted them for a more important reason than that of strategy. I will establish that from 1887 to this date the admiralty has never faltered in its ardent desire of having money contributions from the dominions beyond the seas. I will demonstrate that fact to the satisfaction of my hon. friend and it may surprise him when I enter into that argument, because he may think that, once it is established that the admiralty has never deviated, from 1887 to the present time, from that one policy of contribution, our refusal to give the money must be scandalous. I will discuss that point later. Now there was no emergency in July last. The Prime Minister of England said so. The first Lord of the Admiralty said so. Was there a need? A need of what? Of money? They had announced a surplus of \$32,500,000 the preceding April—that is 6,500,000 pounds of a surplus. Yet I am confronted by the affirmation that the memorandum disclosed a very serious situation. I ask my hon. friends to read that memorandum. They will see nowhere the word 'emergency,' nowhere the word 'need,' nowhere the word 'contribution.' Mr. Borden admits that he approached the admiralty for information and the memorandum says so. I will readily confess that the information furnished was very skilfully and artfully written. It was skilfully prepared for a purpose. It was the last shot, in a long drawn struggle, coming from the admiralty. It was the last attempt to have Australia reverse its policy, of retaining the contribution of New Zealand and of getting the South African contribution to follow suit. If only they could persuade Canada to retrace its steps, to efface the resolution of the 29th March, 1909; if only they could catch that big fish, then they would

land the rest of the dominions, because it had been the constant desire of the admiralty that there should be money contributions and that there should be but one navy. We are face to face to-day, and we have been for a number of years with a conflict of principles. There have been two schools of thought. One that has held, as my hon. friend from Amherst has said, for one king, one flag and one navy. This is his policy. It is the policy of my hon. friend the leader of the government. This I think is also the new policy of the Prime Minister of Canada, and that is why, I am justified in asking if the electors of Canada have been made aware of this reversion of policy, and if they have approved of it. This conflict of principles is based upon the desire of the admiralty to have unity of command. They want unity of command in order to have the greater amount of strength under their control. That is indisputable. This desire is very clear and must be accepted as a true and orthodox one. A school of thinkers who have been trying to shape the destinies of the empire, have also thought that there should be concentration in England, unity of the empire in concentration, and they have therefore helped the admiralty in its desire of having but one navy. This is the situation in London with a certain group of men desiring to reorganize and confederate the empire and to have centralization at London. They see the glory and safety of the empire in unity and concentration. There is another school in Great Britain, but more particularly in the dominions beyond the seas, which sees greater strength in unity through local autonomy, and that school is comprised of the best thinkers in the dominions beyond the seas, as I shall have occasion to show.

At the Colonial conference of 1897, the First Lord of the Admiralty asked for a money contribution, and at that time Australia agreed to the demand. Again, in 1902, there was a call for a money contribution. Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, expressly asked for a contribution, and succeeded in getting the colonies to supply money to the admiralty with one exception—Canada. What did