

if in the precedent the subordinate communities enjoy larger powers of government than will satisfy the claims of the communities for which the new scheme is formed, as it follows necessarily that if such a union be consistent with a less degree of subordination in the inferior communities, it must be maintainable with a greater. Still less will the force of the example be weakened, if in the precedent the central power be vested in functionaries selected by the several communities themselves, instead of in one dominant community, or in other words, if the precedent be a federal system of states, and the proposed scheme an imperial system of colonies. In the former case, the union of the whole body depends on the co-operation of all or the greater part of the members, whilst in the latter the power of a dominant community is ever ready to reduce to obedience any member of the system that may interfere with the welfare of the rest.

Now the precedent I propose to adduce is the constitution of the United States of America, and I have selected it as an example, not only because it is framed in the English language and based on the English law, but because it combines more completely than any government with which I am acquainted unity of the whole with a separate organization of the parts. This combination has been effected by making the constitution of the United States a government over individuals and not over communities, or, in other words, by creating a national and not a federal supreme government. This distinction between a national and federal government seems to require a fuller explanation. Suppose a number of independent states to form an association for the purposes of common protection, and to vest certain rights of supremacy over all the members