The Address-Mr. Rowe

and solved the Suez canal crisis. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, no one knows better than he does that the actions of our government and the claims to fame of our foreign minister have yet to create any practical results in this Middle East crisis.

The events in Hungary offer tragic proof that neither the United Nations nor moral opinion, despite the best hopes of all, can stop communist oppression and the brutalization of whole nations. It therefore follows that the most serious consequence of the developments abroad is that the western alliance, which is the only and best hope of the free world and the only real buttress against communist imperialism, is now endangered. The Prime Minister, according to the press, wrote an angry note to the Prime Minister of Britain. Whether this was approved by the cabinet or whether it was the Prime Minister's personal attitude or whether it was a fit of Irish temper, it has contributed very little and probably done a great deal of harm to the unity and harmony and trust that were essential to the maintenance of a vital alliance with a tried and trusted friend.

It is generally agreed that Russian foreign policy in the Middle East has been consistent, and its aspirations for domination in the Arab world are apparent. Egyptian foreign policy, if not consistent, has at least been understandable. They were willing to accept armaments and war machinery from any government. There can be no secret about Egypt's foreign policy so long as President Nasser heads that government. Like Hitler, Nasser has published in book form the aims and aspirations he has for Egypt. These include the elimination by any means of all British and French influence in the Near East and, as well, the elimination of the state of Israel.

In the case of "Mein Kampf" the western world refused to accept the implications and eventually paid the price of its folly. In the case of Nasser it can be said that the British and French have only done what all the wise men, after the fact, said that Britain and the other western democracies should have done when Hitler first began to carry out the policy he so clearly outlined in his own testament. Even the people of the United States-with the exception of those who are at Washington because I sometimes think those at Washington are like those in Ottawa, and do not always express exactly what the people of the country are thinking—are in substantial agreement that their own policy has been inconsistent. It was a representative of the United States government who gave Nasser his silver pistol. It was the United States government that withdrew promises of assistance in building the Aswan dam. It was the

United States government that prejudiced Britain's oil concessions in Iran to its own self interest.

One of the most shocking things about the developments in Europe and the Near East is that the Canadian government was obviously so ill-prepared for these events. Canada's role, according to the government, has been the interpreter and conciliator between Britain and the United States. It was supposed to be the bridge between these two countries. Instead, in this crisis it has at times almost resembled a chasm.

Since the beginning of this crisis the Canadian people have been consistently misinformed and misled. Whatever the virtue of the government's suggestion, which was originally from the opposition, that a United Nations police force be sent to the Near East, the resultant humiliation suffered by Canada is not easily justified. The Magnificent, that beautiful carrier, was brought home at such speed that the ship was damaged structurally. She was then dismantled and refitted as a troopship. The press of Canada and the television screens were constantly portraying soldiers marching and countermarching in this great national effort to keep peace in the world. Created as the United Nations police force, it now looks like a Nasser force composed of whatever elements he deems suitable to go where he tells them.

The last session of the House of Commons was dominated in the early stages by a debate as to whether or not the government was wise in dispatching to Egypt a few Harvard aircraft. During that debate it developed that the Secretary of State for External Affairs was not sure that these aircraft could be armed or could be used as instruments of war. And now, in this session of the House of Commons, we are debating the matter of sending Canadian servicemen to Egypt, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs does not know, or has not told us, whether or not these men are going to be armed sufficiently to defend themselves, or whether or not they are needed; nor does he know exactly any of the conditions under which they will function; where they will be stationed, or how long they will be needed. The colour of their uniforms may not be acceptable to President Nasser. He does not like them called the Queen's Own Rifles.

Thus, Mr. Speaker, step by step, Colonel Nasser and his Russian friends have steadily tried to emasculate the value of the proposed United Nations police force. We condemn this government for not demanding that the United Nations accept a police force in fact as well as in theory. The United Nations