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needed. Should it be the widely-shared view that the international community's interest would, on balance, be better served by continuing experimentation, it will be necessary to assess the need for a more formal international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions. That possibility was, of course, envisaged in Article V of the treaty. Consistent with the treaty, it would have to ensure that any benefits identified would be available to all non-nuclear-weapon states by way of services provided by the nuclear-weapon powers. To ensure that all states are informed of the results of experimentation and receive non-discriminatory treatment, such a régime should call upon the nuclear-weapon powers to give notice of, and to report on, peaceful applications of nuclear explosions in their own territories. Such a régime, however, could only be acceptable if it did not contribute to the development of nuclear weapons by either the non-nuclear-weapon states or by the nuclear-weapon powers.

This conference cannot be expected to resolve this complex issue. It involves many aspects. However, the conference should call upon the appropriate international bodies, particularly the IAEA, to see that this important question is fully explored.

I have referred to some aspects of the treaty that should be reviewed at this conference in the interest of engendering greater support for the treaty's objectives. The treaty's purposes will also be served -- and perhaps be best served -- by more vigorous efforts to lessen the tensions that exist between states in so many areas of the world today. The general effort of states to improve the international climate is paramount to discouraging the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Obviously, for those states in areas of current strife, the objective of greater regional stability and peace is vital. Article VII of the treaty points to the positive contribution that can be made to regional stability and non-proliferation by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such arrangements could find their basis simply in co-ordinated ratifications of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by states of a region. An incentive to such efforts would be an offer by the nuclear-weapon states of specific security assurances in respect of parties to such regional undertakings.

Canada's objectives at this conference can be summarized thus: First, we seek to obtain a clear recognition by the nuclear-weapon states of the urgency and necessity of reversing the momentum of the nuclear-arms race and an affirmation by them of greater determination to reduce their nuclear-destructive capabilities. Second, we wish to see a recognition by all non-nuclear-weapon states that their security interests are best served by preventing a further proliferation of

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