

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Nevertheless, they are considerably below our expectations. I believe that any delegation represented here will agree that much more could have been done.

What are the reasons for this? Of course, the work has been affected, and it could not fail to be affected, by the very unfavourable situation prevailing in the world at present. But specifically, in the context of the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is impossible to ignore the fact that at the height of the negotiations on this item during the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Senate of the United States Congress approved allocations for the programme for the production of a new type of chemical weapons -- binary weapons. One frequently hears it argued that the production of binary weapons is necessary to the United States so that it can bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. Those who cherish such illusions should not forget that peace is indivisible and there is such a notion as retaliatory measures. The decision adopted by the United States Senate to allocate in fiscal year 1984 130.6 million dollars for the production of binary munitions, including the creation of the "Big Eye" chemical air bomb and the production of shells for 155 mm howitzers, represents another step in the implementation of the United States \$10 billion programme of preparations for chemical war, and threatens the renewed spiralling of the chemical arms race. The programme, it is known, envisages the mass production of new types of chemical weapons and the working out of methods for their use, as well as the stationing and storage of new types of chemical weapons primarily on the territory of western Europe, near the borders of the socialist States. We cannot view this decision of the American Senate otherwise than as further evidence that the present policy of the United States in the matter of the prohibition of chemical weapons is determined, not by the declared desire of the official United States representatives to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons, but by the desire at all costs to keep a free hand in order to implement the Pentagon's large-scale plans for the stockpiling and building up of the United States chemical arsenal. Of course, this decision adopted in Washington has strengthened the doubts of many States as to the sincerity of the United States desire to achieve agreements in the Committee on Disarmament.

But is it not possible that the very delicate thread of patience in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons may be broken when such things happen, for example, as the following: the Vice-President of the United States comes here to the Committee to advocate the speeding up of the negotiations in order to eliminate the threat created by chemical weapons, and a few months later he gives a decisive vote in favour of the implementation of the programme which could kill these negotiations?

Nor has progress in our negotiations been facilitated by the fact that the same delegation, which submitted to the Committee last spring its version of the basic provisions of a convention and which was prepared in theory to take note of any concurring or similar views on the part of delegations on various aspects of the future convention, has avoided by every possible means the recording of such concurrences in the form of draft wordings for the future convention. As was justly stated by Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil, we badly need formulas recording the results achieved, which could be regarded as "a common basis for the future work of consolidation". Moreover we have even noticed the following trend. The position of the United States delegation has in some respects departed