

establishment. This is not the place to examine such a proposition, but the implied claim that a privileged background explains how Norman got ahead in the government is patent nonsense. He won competitive scholarships to Cambridge and Harvard where he associated, as we have seen, mostly with non-establishment left-wingers. His entry into External was portrayed by Barros, somewhat inconsistently, and incorrectly, as the result of "assiduous persistence." (29) "He lifted heaven and earth ... to make sure that he was taken on by External Affairs," Barros told David Kilgour, M.P. in a briefing paper. In fact it was clearly a case of External meeting a well-defined need for a specialist in Japanese. No pull was required. The correspondence with the Under-Secretary, Dr. O.D. Skelton, was "diffident, not persistent" (Hillmer, 564) and Barros' notion that the Under-Secretary, because of his own pink past, might have been soft on a young left-winger is laughable; Skelton's doctoral dissertation on Socialism, one that Barros claims was praised by Lenin, was in fact a stringent critique, and Skelton was a strong nationalist and conservative. Moreover, Norman Hillmer, the authority on Skelton, has not, been able to find evidence to support the Lenin myth. Alas!

Why did Norman prefer diplomacy to one of the several university chairs he was offered? Barros claims it was because he had been "programmed" at Cambridge, perhaps by "Otto," to become a Soviet mole in the Canadian government. He attaches no importance to the possibility that he didn't like teaching. (Norman had been dismissed from Upper Canada College for inability to keep order, and he disliked speaking to groups.) Nor did Barros consider the large number of scholars, starting with Skelton and Pearson, who preferred Parliament Hill and proximity to power, to the Ivory Tower. Norman, moreover, was sufficiently a genius to have it both ways; he could succeed as a diplomat, and remain a prolific, world renowned scholar in his chosen field.

Why did Pearson defend him? Barros suggests that it was partly because their fathers were both Methodist ministers, but even more because Pearson and Norman were both Soviet sympathisers. He cannot recognise that Pearson, and others in the Department, considered Norman to be an outstanding official, and loyal to Canada; not to defend him would have been both unjust and very damaging to morale in the Department. He does note that Pearson defined the issue as one of national sovereignty, and was angered by the gross meddling by a witch-hunting Congressional committee. So too was most of Canada, a fact that Pearson the politician could not ignore.