

producing the lethal and toxic chemical agents permitted for research into defence and protection to ensure that only permissible amounts were being produced and that these amounts were being used for the stated purposes.

13. While it has been argued that to be certain of non-production, verification measures would have to be highly intrusive, we consider that it should be possible to establish a verification procedure capable of detecting any large-scale production which would be acceptable to all States parties. This could be by a combination of near-site and on-site inspections; monitoring of consumption of raw material against declared chemical production; and national verification measures to detect stockpiles and production facilities. By monitoring the consumption of raw materials and the production of final products at selected chemical factories, the Consultative Committee might be able to spot any large-scale syphoning of potential chemical warfare agents into military stockpiles. Similarly, national verification measures should be able to spot large-scale military stockpiles. Regular near-site inspections in the vicinity of selected chemical factories producing dual-purpose agents for peaceful purposes would allow the Consultative Committee to analyse the air, water and soil around the factory, without intruding into the factory premises, and thereby gain an idea of what the factory is producing. However, none of these measures could adequately replace on-site inspections - i.e. Consultative Committee officials being allowed inside the factory to observe for themselves that no forbidden chemical warfare agent production was taking place. These could be undertaken on challenge, or, preferably, regularly on the basis of a random selection by the Consultative Committee of a certain number of factories to be visited each year. In the latter case the option to ask for an on-site inspection on challenge would also be retained as part of the complaints procedure.

14. Confidence in compliance will of course be greatly enhanced if States are prompt in responding to requests for information or visits, and if States can arrange additional verification measures on a bilateral or regional basis. As confidence in the effectiveness of a Convention grows, so States will be more willing to take part in confidence-building measures.

Complaints procedure

15. The United Kingdom believes that all States party should undertake to consult each other and to co-operate in solving any problems that may arise in relation to the implementation of the provisions of the Convention. This should be a firm commitment. We believe that States should be obliged to provide evidence if their compliance is challenged by another State party. However, we should hope