

primarily because of an extremely complex set of problems. These included not only the traditional security issues of asymmetry in force structures, diverging strategic-operational concepts and force deployment levels, but also the complete political, diplomatic, economic and human relationship network. The Stockholm negotiation did not attempt to solve any of these problems. The agreement does not impinge on the sovereignty of any nation, nor does it compromise anyone's security interests. The document does provide, however, for increased mutual confidence and for diminished suspicions of the kind which could lead to dangerous miscalculations.

## STOCKHOLM AND ARMS CONTROL

The CCSBMDE has shown that security and arms control are not mutually exclusive; rather, they go hand-in-hand. "Arms control arrangements should be assessed primarily in terms of their contribution to the maintenance of a stable East-West military balance"<sup>5</sup>, with the tacit recognition that long-term East-West "political rivalry will not be ended even by a comprehensive arms control agreement."<sup>6</sup> The confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that have been adopted in Stockholm have a political effect: they build confidence by increasing communications and openness about military activities.

What the Stockholm Conference accomplished was a step in the multinational process, moving from the so-called first generation Helsinki CBMs to a system of new and more binding CSBMs that could be more effective in reducing the potential causes of armed conflict. This step can contribute in the political sense by reducing tensions and building a more constructive relationship between the East and West and could contribute to progress with the more difficult issue of actual arms reductions.

## DIVERGING EAST-WEST INTERESTS

The fundamental policies of states are driven by long term and short term political objectives which reflect their vital interests.<sup>7</sup> The pursuit of such vital interests by the superpowers and the two military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), has led to antagonisms that have not been conducive to the pursuit of arms control. These antagonisms, exacerbated by lack of East-West contact, traditional mistrust and public rhetoric, are real and stem from fundamental historical differences. It is not only a question of political differences concerning ideology, justice and liberty. Underlying the West's mistrust of the East's military intentions has been the existing division of Europe, which "was the result of Soviet military and political imperatives,"<sup>8</sup> and the proposition that

capitalism must and will disappear.<sup>9</sup> The East, for its part, creates a mirror image of those perceptions and sees the West as threatening its system.

Because of such differences, not surprisingly, the CSCE, while providing a forum for arms control, has brought face to face negotiators who use the same words to express different ideas. Thus the East and the West are best able to reach mutually acceptable compromises often only at the price of ambiguous formulae safeguarding, sometimes in the same single provision, their respective positions on basic concepts. The Stockholm Document is not exempt. For example, the CSBM calling for prior notification of certain military activities requires a numerical notification trigger of 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks if they are engaged in a military activity at any time. In addition the measure requires that certain conditions must be met for such notification: it has to be a single activity in the zone of application, conducted under a single operational command and organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments not necessarily subordinate to the same division. The last condition is ambiguous. The Western interpretation is that notification below divisional size is possible. This understanding is not shared by the WTO or by some of the NNA. The WTO maintains this condition enables states without divisional organizations (e.g. Canada and Norway) to participate in prior notification. In practice, while WTO divisions contain more tanks and artillery giving them similar combat power, they normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO divisions.<sup>10</sup> It is therefore unlikely that WTO prior notifications would be below two divisions.

While some differences are profound and are a challenge for every East-West negotiation, they do not foreclose the possibility of political and diplomatic results based on "the security interests of all"<sup>11</sup> in avoiding conflict. Results were possible at Stockholm, because of a common interest in reducing the risk of conflict through misperception, without jeopardizing perceived national security needs and the political will to do so. The outcome was a non-zero-sum game; that is, there were no 'losers' or 'winners'; benefits accrued to all concerned.

## THE CSCE PROCESS

General developments and specific political events either promote arms control negotiations or make them more difficult. Where confidence exists, the prospects for progress are better. Arms control negotiations, however, can be instruments of practical policy and can themselves contribute to the improvement of international relations. Stockholm seems to confirm the latter instance. There the process was made easier because a previously agreed political framework for negotiations already existed — the CSCE.