

aggressions, like that lately at Irai, on the frontier; and are complaining also of the mild demeanor of the government at Madrid, where it is understood that Narvaez is conducting his *coup d'état* to narrow the "constitution," not without countenance or advice from Paris; and the *Moniteur*, alluding to such reports as being "not without foundation," puts forth the most equivocal disclaimer. In Germany we know that military men feel uneasy at the manageable state of the enormous military power which Louis Napoleon holds in his single hand. It is indeed enormous, and the organisation of France at this moment is becoming daily more military. Even the Imperial household is expected to become so, like an Eastern Court. At a festival of the Military School in Paris, the other day, the chairman said to the scholars:—

"Gentlemen, the Emperor reckons upon your services abroad as he has reckoned upon your services at home. The re-establishment of the Empire is the re-establishment of our national frontiers—those of the Rhine. If people do not choose to give up those frontiers to us, we know how to take possession of them ourselves; and the Emperor will be at our head."

As we have already said, this is not all. There are some further threats, which have a little come before the public as the full means of counteraction on our part have been made known. The grand thing for us is, that the public spirit is roused both in and out of office. In this sense we take as excellent signs the many suggestions which are afloat for augmenting the national defences. Suggestions like the "Plan for forming a Sea Fencible Force," dividing the coasts into districts, and enrolling all the seagoing population into a naval reserve, by Captain Charles Elliot; or the "Defence of our Mercantile Sea Ports," with easily constructed fortifications, by a "Retired Officer;" or Mr. James Ferguson's totally new plan of fortification on a simpler and more effective mode; with many others, are worthy of consideration by proper authorities; but to the public they are evidences chiefly of the attention which must be devoted to such subjects amongst scientific men unattached.

One thing is quite certain—as judged by the standard of perfection, our defences cannot be "sufficient." Such changes have taken place in the Art of War, that on the next general conflict, when all the resources of Europe shall be called out new inventions will come into play, and other counteractives will have to be devised on the spur of the moment. The questions which agitate the scientific world—whether forts with stone trimmings are strong to resist or more fatal to the defenders; whether the preponderance of power in the attack as compared with the defence, which marks the modern warfare, can be counter-balanced by increase in the power of defence; whether the preponderance of firing power can be given to the fort instead of the besieger—are questions that will have to be settled definitively in the field. In the meanwhile, the spirit of active and impartial though scientific inquiry is really alive; and that is the great thing. The true staple of national strength lies in the spirit of the people; the spirit of sacrifice, both of time, property, and self; the determination not only to resist, but to conquer; and that spirit is fairly aroused. It will, we believe, strengthen the hands of our officials to maintain the outposts of English power; for, possibly, should the caprice of a sudden blow at England be abandoned as too costly, the first contest will have to be taken in Malta or Gibraltar.

From the London Economist.

We regard, as perfectly indisputable that Louis Napoleon's Government is decidedly and most generally popular in France. We may be amazed that it should be so, we may despise the French because it is so, we may grieve that a people who have once tasted the pleasures and the dignity of self-government should be willing to abdicate their functions into the hands of a supreme and irresponsible ruler; we may moralise as we please over the blind insanity of a nation whose notions of the national *sumum bonum* are so strangely at variance with our own:—but we must accept the fact—as one to be deplored, if we like, and to be explained, if we can,—but still to be received and laid to heart as the basis of our reasonings, if we would not run into perilous and fatal blunders. For, be it observed, Louis Napoleon's position is a very different one, both as regards his stability and his power of acting upon other nations, if he be the welcome, chosen, and accepted Emperor of the French, from what it would be were he a mere bold adventurer who had usurped by stratagem and force a throne from which an oppressed and outraged people were watching for a favorable opportunity to hurl him. In the one case, his whole strength must be reserved for and concentrated upon the preservation of his ravished sceptre from his numerous internal conspirators and foes:—in the other, it will be all available for whatever ulterior designs he may entertain against foreign enemies and rivals.

But, though his rule is popular, there is no enthusiasm either for the Government or for the man. Neither his manners nor his character are fitted to excite enthusiasm. The official attempts to create it, and to represent it as existing, have been both injudicious and unsuccessful. In all his grand displays, his splendid shows, his gorgeous progresses and parades, intended to dazzle and please the populace, he appears to us to have made a great mistake and to have incurred merited failure. He has carried these Spectacles so far as to annoy and disgust the more rational and thoughtful of his supporters: he has carried them too far even for the childish and meretricious taste of that splendour-loving people; he has overshot his mark, and created even among his popular allies an uneasy feeling that he is treating them rather too much like barbarians or babies. He is popular, not because he has dazzled the excitable imaginations of the people over whom he rules, not because he commands or can arouse any of that loyalty or devotion which the Highlanders felt for Charles Edward or the old veterans for Napoleon the great—it is a blunder on his part to pretend that he has it or to fancy that he can excite it—but because there is a general deliberate, cool, *motived* (to use a French word) conviction that the man and the regime are those best suited to the actual condition, and possibly to the habitual character, of France; that no hand less resolute, no form of government less dictatorial, would be competent to deal with so shattered, wearied, and demoralized a country; and that only out of the strengthening, recreating, reorganising rest which a despotic rule can ensure and enforce, can be hoped to dawn a healthier and better state of things.

It is a mistake to imagine that the Empire will be popular with only the ignorant peasantry and the ambitious army. From different motives and in different degrees, it is popular with all classes—except the

Rouges, who for the most part are enemies of all government, who are composed of the wild turbulent fanatics, the sanguinary ruffians, and the hopeless incorrigible rascals who abound in most communities, and whose party, though still numerous and restless, has been too effectually beheaded to be as formidable as it once was,—and the *Doctrinaires* and their followers, who, naturally and perhaps justly, furious at having been jockeyed, defeated, gagged, and reduced to insignificance. It is the hostility of this section which weighs most strongly against Louis Napoleon and the Imperial regime in the opinion of Englishmen: and it is quite natural that it should do so. This section includes nearly all those politicians whose names are known in England; it includes the dynastic opposition as well as the principal ministers of Louis Philippe; it includes most of the literati whose reputation has crossed the Channel; and its members were nearly all admirers of the Parliamentary Constitution of England, and the persevering advocates of the introduction of a similar system in France. All these things naturally give the opinions of this party overwhelming influence in England; and it is difficult to believe that a government which ignores, banishes, or repels at once Guizot, Thiers, De Tocqueville, De Beaumont, Broglie, Molé, and Dufaure, can really be welcome to or fairly represent the French nation. We have long been accustomed to regard those men as the most able and enlightened politicians in France, and to consider them as the defenders and promoters of a constitutional freedom somewhat like our own; it is their writings we have been accustomed to admire; it is from them that we have been accustomed to take our notions of French interests and French opinions. They formed a galaxy of political and literary talent which shone in the eyes of foreign nations with a lustre which obscured and put out all lesser but more national lights. For the truth we believe to be, that these eminent men with all their brilliancy never had any strong hold on the nation; they were beyond it, above it, apart from it, rather than its leaders or representatives; their ideas and objects of admiration were English rather than French; their talent as writers and speakers gave them vast influence as long as Parliamentary Government prevailed; but they have never inoculated the people with their views; their party was select, but their followers were few. Partly from their merits, but still more from their faults; partly from the *Parliamentariness* and therefore the *unfrenchness* of their notions; partly from the intriguing character of several among them; partly from the notorious and awful corruption of the Government which they administered in turn; and partly from the deplorable, disreputable, and clumsy catastrophe in which they finished their career,—they are now with five-sixths of Frenchmen the most utterly damaged, discredited, and unpopular party in the country; and were they to join the Emperor and become his Ministers, such a step, which we in England should regard as his sanction and his safeguard, would in France probably be fatal to his power. This position and situation of the *Doctrinaire* party in their own country must be fully understood before we can judge of the actual posture of French affairs.

The present Government, as is universally allowed, is popular with the peasantry, especially with that preponderating part of them who are proprietors; and for these reasons:—First and foremost, on account of the name which stands at its head. The first Napoleon, as we have more than once had occasion to observe, wrote his name indelibly upon the soil of France, and no subsequent ruler has left any impression there at all. His memory is still venerated, not only as the great representative of military glory, but as the strong and skilful reorganiser of the nation after the calamities and confusion of the Revolution. Mere relationship to him is a tower of strength. Secondly—The French peasantry, as proprietors and peaceful cultivators of the soil, feel the want of steadiness and order as distinctly as any part of the community; they had been kept in a perpetual state of disturbance and uneasiness by the changes and rumors of change which succeeded one another for so many years with such bewildering rapidity, and the political motives and causes of which excited in them no interest, and were altogether beyond their comprehension; and they believe that Louis Napoleon has the strong arm and iron will needed to secure for them the rest they sigh for. Moreover—and this is a point which has been almost entirely overlooked—they do not, it is true, love despotism, or deliberately wish to place over them a wholly irresponsible or autocratic master, but they comprehend the rule of one man: they do not and never did comprehend the Government of a mob of masters—a numerous divided, and wrangling Assembly. We may deplore this incapacity on their part; we may despise their ignorance and their proclivity to servitude; but we must accept the fact, and reckon on it. The only period when they were without a sovereign, they were governed and harassed by the Clubs, the Communes, the Revolutionary Committees, the Paris Commissaries, the imbecile Directory; and we can scarcely wonder that they shrink from anything which reminds them in the least of those gloomy, anarchical, and sanguinary times. Thirdly—The influence of the priests—a great part of them at least—has been diligently exerted on behalf of the present regime, and this influence is very great in many districts, and has of late years been steadily and to a considerable degree deservedly increasing. Their control and direction would often according to our views, be exerted for mischief; but still it is said that ever since the Revolution of 1830 they have sedulously and unremittingly performed their duty among the poor, taught them the obligations and administered to them the consolations of religion, visited them in sickness, advised and assisted them in trouble, supported them in the hour of death, and kept up in their hearts the much needed sentiments of obedience and devotion. They are now reaping their reward; and their influence—much as we may regret that such power should be wielded by such unenlightened hands—has been fairly and legitimately earned. Whether Louis Napoleon will ultimately turn out to be either the sturdy friend or the obedient son of the Church, which the priesthood hope that he is and will remain, may well be doubted; but at present throughout the rural districts of France they are his zealous and efficient allies.

The present Government is popular among a great proportion of the *outriers* of most of the towns—of Paris in particular. Many of these, no doubt—the idle and dissipated of them to a man—belonged to the *Rouges* whom Louis Napoleon scourged and decimated with such stern severity; and these, we must suppose, nurse against him a bitter spirit of animosity and revenge. But the Assembly were as hostile to the *Rouges* as Louis Napoleon himself; and he has snuffed and outwitted the Assembly. Cavaignac

slaughtered and deported them even more mercilessly than Louis Napoleon, and Louis Napoleon defeated and imprisoned Cavaignac. Then Louis Napoleon hates the *bourgeoisie*—whom the *Rouges* also hate.—So that if the President and anarchists do not love each other, they have at least the bond or union of having most of their enemies in common. But the industrious and well-disposed workmen have many solid reasons for adhering to the new Government.—They look to employment from the public works which the President is carrying forward on a large scale.—At present not only the regular workmen of Paris, but numbers who have been summoned from the country, are in receipt of ample, even large, earnings. Then the Empire is—or is believed and suspected to be—order and stability; and order and stability are to the workmen the synonyms of plenty and comfort. In times of anarchy and disturbance men lose money and retrench. Hence the tailor, the grocer, and shoemaker, the armourer, the coachmaker, the saddler, the watchmaker, the jeweller, and all Napoleonists—where no personal feeling arising out of the death or deportation of a *Rouge* relative interferes to overbear the dictates of material interest. The paralysing effect of 1848 upon Parisian and Lyonnese industry is not, and will not be for long, forgotten.

Again—strange as it may seem—a considerable portion of the Socialists are for the moment adherents of the new Emperor. It is true that it is from them he is said to have "saved society;" it is true that where he imprisoned one *bourgeois* he imprisoned a hundred Socialists; it is true that Socialism is still the bogbear which his advocates hold up before the upper and middle classes as the mysterious horror against which he is their only bulwark. But the Socialists must not be altogether confounded with the Red Republicans. No doubt in many places and to a great extent, they are identical. But the objects and aspirations of numbers who bear that proscribed name are social rather than political; and it is believed, and we think with reason that Louis Napoleon is strongly imbued with some of the Socialist notions; it is known that he has occupied himself much with the subject of pauperism; and it is supposed that he is busy with some scheme for its extinction, which will be promulgated as soon as it is ripe, and he is firmly established on the Imperial throne. He has all along shown a disposition to base his throne rather on the support of the masses of the people than on the middle or upper classes; and many of the former are in the habit of saying—"Ah! Louis Blanc and Louis Napoleon are both Socialists, but the first was an extravagant theorist—the latter is a practical man."

The commercial and manufacturing classes—as men who can only thrive in peace and permanence—are generally friends to the duration of the present Government, and will remain so as long as the Empire keeps clear of war, which would be fatal to his popularity among them. These classes, and those whom they employ have been enormously prosperous ever since the *coup d'état*; and the proclamation of the Empire seems like a seal set upon that stability which has already done so much for them. They are everywhere extending their transactions, embarking in longer and more distant adventures, and even fixing capital which since 1848 they had kept in realisable securities or in actual cash. They know that a change would be fatal to all their plans, and they will discourage every thing which tends even to excite the fear of one.

There can scarcely be a fairer or more speaking indication of the condition and state of feeling among the industrious ranks than is afforded by the Savings Banks accounts. Now we find that in the *Caisse des Retraites*, as it is called, in the quarter ending last October, the deposits amounted to 22,000,000 francs, and the sum withdrawn to only 3,000,000 francs, showing an actual accumulation of capital, on the part of the industrious classes, to the extent of 19,000,000 francs. But what more especially merits remark, is the extraordinary progress of the *Caisse des Retraites for old age*. It was only founded in May 1851, and on Dec. 31 had only accumulated 1,212,000 francs. On the 30th of September last, it possessed a capital of 22,572,000 francs. Out of 15,431 depositors, 6,602 are workpeople, properly so called, of whom 2,966 are women—771 artisans, or petty dealers, 611 servants, 2,105 employes in humble situations, 363 soldiers and sailors, 718 persons exercising liberal professions, principally priests, and 4,361 without professions, half of them minors.

Farther. The new regime is popular with a very large portion of the Legitimists,—and this portion comprising the most energetic, wise, and far-sighted of that party. They believe that Louis Napoleon is not ill disposed to the Comte de Chambord, and that, if he has no children, he will not be averse to look upon the Comte as his successor. The gentle and almost respectful tone in which the recent manifesto of the Comte was spoken of in the *Moniteur*, goes far to confirm this impression. At all events the Legitimists feel that every year that Louis Napoleon can hold sway in France will make their future advent and power more probable and more easy, if he should not succeed in founding an hereditary dynasty, and living till its consolidation. They feel that he will settle the disturbed and suppress the turbulent elements of French society,—that he will accustom the French once more to a firm and autocratic rule,—and that not improbably he will re-establish an aristocracy which may ultimately blend with and reinforce their own. They believe also, that while doing all this, he will fall into blunders and create enemies which will make many persons willing to exchange him for Henri V. Finally, they feel and admit that he is a fitter man for the present posture of affairs than the Comte de Chambord would be; that the Prince is doing the work of the Comte better than the Comte could do it for himself;—for the one is soft and yielding, the other stern inflexible, and unrelenting. Few among the Legitimists are anxious for an immediate restoration.

Lastly. The new regime is popular among all who want repose; among those who are weary of perpetual turmoil, and those who are sick of repeated failures; among those—and there are many of them—who believe that as soon as he feels himself firmly seated on the Imperial throne, Louis Napoleon will discard some of his worst associates, and relax much of that despotic grip which is endurable only in a crisis of peril and transition; among those real and deeply-thoughtful friends of true freedom—and there are such—who know from history and from reflection that civil liberties can be more easily won by gradual encroachment from a monarch, than engrafted upon anarchy, or created by a stroke; and who hope that the present darkness may be a starting point for the dawn of a better day.—And, to sum up and conclude the whole, the new Emperor is not popular, but his continuance

and stability are earnestly desired by those politicians who feel with deep anxiety that he has no rival, and that if he were now to be cut off he could have no successor,—who believe and know that between Louis Napoleon and anarchy lies at present no third alternative. The honest Republicans are surprisingly few and feeble, the old politicians of the Chambers are loathed and scouted by all but their own small following; the country has not yet received the idea of the possibility of a Bourbon restoration; and the sins and shortcomings of the Orleans Princes must have time to be forgotten before their chance can become a hopeful one. We doubt, from the best information we have been able to obtain, whether (putting aside the Reds and the *mauvais sujets*) out of the thirty-six millions of the French nation, a hundred men could be found who do not deliberately believe that the destruction or discomfiture of Louis Napoleon would be the most awful calamity that could happen to the country, in the present posture of affairs.

The most serious dangers and the greatest degree of unpopularity of the new Emperor must be sought for in the very last quarter where we in England should dream of looking for it—in the ranks of the army and navy. Numbers in both services are hostile to Louis Napoleon. Numbers more will almost inevitably become so. Many regiments were greatly attached to the Orleans Princes—the navy very generally to the Prince de Joinville. Many regiments—especially in Algeria—were devoted to the generals whom Louis Napoleon banished or imprisoned. The favors and decorations which he has showered upon one portion of the army have disgusted those who have been left out in the distribution. The creation of an Imperial Guard, which is looked for, will augment and spread the discontent. Some corps have already been disbanded for disaffection; the decreed reduction of the army, coupled as it is with an ordinance calling out the conscription for next year (the omission of which would have been the simple and natural mode of effecting a real reduction, had such been intended), we believe to be merely a contrivance for getting rid of disaffected or intractable regiments; and on the whole, the state of feeling in the army is understood to have given the President more anxiety than any of his other difficulties.

Such, we believe, to be a faithful account of the real opinion and sentiment of France with regard to the Empire and the man who is to fill the Imperial throne. Of the character of the new Emperor, his views, his dangers, his necessities, and his probable career, if his life is spared, we must speak on a future occasion.

THE LADY ABOLITIONISTS.

The estimable ladies who have held a species of public meetings on American affairs in an exclusive and carpeted saloon of Stafford House, have suffered Lord Shaftesbury to lead them into a false position.—In the name of benevolence he appealed to them; and seldom is the female heart closed against that appeal—especially when it is made by the authenticated, titled, and gracious coryphaeus of established philanthropy, and most especially when the call of benevolence conducts those whom it flatters by its summons into such distinguished presence. Many ladies convened to the female Parliament of which the Duchesse was host and president, may hereafter plead the writ of summons in proof of station in the republic of fashion or letters. The Negro has said, in the medalion of the Slave-trade Suppression Society, "Am I not a man and a brother?" for some years, without recognition by this organized sisterhood; but when it is a graceful Evangelical Earl who asks, "Is he not a man and a brother?" and the fair ladies are invited to affirm the fact in choros to their sisters in America, from the courtly precincts of St. James's Palace, there is preferment in the work.

Nevertheless, the ladies must have felt the falseness of their position in the strictures from which even their sex could not shield them. They have stepped into the dual saloon, but out of their province. Not that opinion is forbidden to them, or even declaration of opinion; but that the particular proceeding was more than the spontaneous utterance of opinion.—or much less than the utterance of opinion by "the women of England." Certain ladies can no more claim that title than certain potentates of Topley street who spoke as "the people of England." The ladies had no authority to assemble in any corporate capacity. They had no power to act. If they had, they evidently neglected to consider what it was that they were about to do. They were proposing to meddle with the internal institution of a foreign country: a doubtful step even for men, much more so for women unversed in public affairs. But of all institutions, that which they proposed to meddle with was the one most tabooed against rash and incompetent handling.—The American people are divided on the subject; the best intellects of the Republic, who are most conversant with it, are most anxious for a settlement, but most conscious that the time is not ripe for it, and that to precipitate a settlement could only induce frightful calamity. The principles of the future settlement are predetermined. Under such circumstances, the rash intrusion of foreign importunity and meddling is most objectionable, even if the intruders had any machinery for carrying forward that purpose. They have none.

Or if they have an indirect influence through their prestige and the political station of certain husbands, then that consideration was precisely of a kind to make them pause. The rank and prestige which are factitiously lent to the meeting may give it an undue importance in the eyes of Americans, and may irritate where the agitation cannot ameliorate. Nay, the ladies compromise their husbands, who in many cases are in a position that ought to make them shrink from being thus compromised. It is useless to say that Lord Derby, Lord John Russell, and Lord Palmerston, were not present. We all know in England, and they know it well in the United States, that very few English wives take any public step without at least the permission, and usually the cheerful permission, the positive concurrence, of their husbands. It is most important that on a question of this kind, not relating to the slave-trade on the ocean, but relating to an internal institution, neither of those noblemen should be in the slightest degree compromised; but they have been so by the meeting at Stafford House. Entering upon a polite agitation which can do nothing towards effecting its object—unenlightened by any distinct idea as to the method of making progress—all that the amiable conspirators have been able to do, is to drag the names of official and public men, their husbands, into a false position.—Spectator.