of mental states, a panorama of subjective pictures with no reality either in the world or in mind, and estimate again the value of life. The material now vanishes with the ideal; positive science, conscious incentives, wealth, distinction, glory, fade from pursuit, for the material is a phantom show as mind and its utterances are. And what is left? Ask Helvetius, Diderot, and La Mettrie and they will answer—sensations, gleams of pleasure, atoms of living, fragments of joy which palls in the quietness of spent desire or grows feverish with desire not yet spent.

But the affirmative answer to the question "Is there truth?" brings back the worth of living. If the senses are true, natural science is true, discovery and invention are leading us on to the ultimate revelation of nature's secret things; if the mind is true, its intimations of spiritual reality, of emotional satisfactions, of self-realization by self-control and choice of the best, are true, and its assurances of a goal, a destiny, are true. Life has now a meaning where before it was as blank as the wastes of Egyptian sand and as inscrutable as the flinty face that keeps watch upon Egyptian solitudes.

Note further the bearing of the answer of this question upon society and its institutions. Society is a structure based upon rights, rights waived and rights secured, mutually understood and respected. Let the restraints be moved from within, the authority of the voice which teaches me altruism and reciprocity of obligation and duty, and I become an enemy to society, an iconoclast, an anarchist, a political libertine. If morality is custom, why may I not deviate from custom? Who made custom my master? If government is a compact, who may say that I am a party to the compact; and if unwilling, by what authority, my own nature affording no imperative, may I be compelled? If law is convention, and convention convenience, why not my convenience? A doctrine which runs to the brink of the French Revolution—a social disintegration due to individualism in philosophy.

We are thus led to see that the problems which the philosophic spirit sets itself are not different from the ordinary questions of our lives. We judge men every day by their philosophy, their views on just those questions which philosophers discuss. My second proposition, accordingly, is this: that its effects on life are, in the general