

analysing the attributes of such a balance and attempting to predict what factors lead to its breakdown. The analysis of concepts such as these is useful if only because they powerfully influence policy. Analysis may not change the policy. But it offers a rationale for change if that is needed.

Finally, there may be significant payoffs to be gained by speculation about the future. As Herman Kahn has said: "Policy planning requires some idea of what the world is going to be like when these policies come to fruition." (*Things to Come*, Macmillan, 1972) Political scientists do not claim to be able to predict political behaviour, but to bring to bear evidence which narrows the range of probabilities. Statesmen learn from history, sometimes to their misfortune. If history is accelerating as fast as some think, it may be wiser to look forward than back. It is noticeable that scholars write increasingly about "world politics" and "world society", emphasizing such phenomena as satellite communications, energy resources and international business and political élites, i.e. a transnational rather than a national focus. It is difficult for the reader to jump the gap between this world and the daily headlines which announce that Spain did this or Malaysia did that, but sometimes the two coincide, e.g. energy shortages. If the statesman cannot afford to make his decisions by betting on alternative futures, he should at least know what trends are more explicit than others.

American preconceptions

Even assuming, however, that international relations evolve towards world politics more quickly than we expect, states must continue to deal with more or less unusual situations. Canadian students of international politics are faced with reading lists which may be composed of books 90 percent American in origin, 5 percent British or European and 5 percent Canadian. American scholars have pioneered the new ways of looking at politics but, not surprisingly, their case material is largely American. Canadian scholars are just beginning to apply the new tools to Canadian foreign policy, i.e. systematic examination of external influences on our foreign policy, case studies of decision-making, the notion of integration as it applies to Canada-U.S. relations (economists have, of course, studied this relationship closely). But American preconceptions still tend to dom-

inate the content of courses. Hypotheses or prescriptions about the management of international conflict or crises are of concern to all peoples in a nuclear world but, inasmuch as Canadian experience, aside from peacekeeping, has little to offer to the conflict-data bank, it might make better sense for Canadian teachers and students to do more work on such themes as international resource regulation, the role of multinational corporations, the nature of economic development, the rights of minorities, and ideas of rank and role (Canada is not by any definition a small country except by the one we like to apply — comparison with the United States). One disadvantage of American texts on comparative politics is that Canada is rarely compared to any other country. Our own perceptions of Canada would benefit by such comparison if we could find the talent and time. This is not to argue for a parochial approach to the study of international politics but for shaping our approach to fit the material in which we have a special interest and, it is to be hoped, competence.

The Department of External Affairs, for its part, has taken steps in the last few years to encourage greater contact with the academic community, including the holding of seminars, the funding of short-term research and the employment of scholars for 9- to 12-month periods to work on current problems. Three or more officers of the Department each year attempt to grapple with foreign policy questions in the stimulating environment of universities. The Policy Analysis Group tries to keep abreast of techniques for planning and analysis.

Not long ago, a British civil servant, after study of these techniques, wrote a book in which he imagined a scene in the Foreign Office ten years hence, illustrating discussion of the latest Middle East crisis on the basis of a scale of probabilities keyed to the study of past behaviour. He called it a "calibration of the field of nations" (Nigel Forward, *The Field of Nations*, Macmillan, 1971) We shall probably not have international slide-rules in foreign offices for a good many years yet, but there seems little question that new ways of looking at world problems and new ways of thinking about the future are here to stay. If Kepler is not yet among us, Metternich must still learn to accommodate change.

There may be special payoffs 'to be gained by speculation about the future'

Canadian scholars just beginning to apply the new tools to foreign policy