

separate from but in association with a non-proliferation treaty, commitments which would make a real contribution to the prevention of further proliferation (horizontally and vertically) and to a consolidation of international stability.

Reference to "balance of obligations" and proliferation leads me to a separate but closely-related facet of the nuclear problem -- Ballistic Missile Defence. When the non-nuclear countries speak of mutual obligations, they are alluding to their insistence that the nuclear powers give evidence of a willingness to reduce their nuclear armouries -- or, at a minimum, agree not to enlarge them. The demand is that, if the nuclear-arms race cannot yet be reversed, it should at least be stopped. In this respect, deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missiles by the United States would be widely construed as a rejection of the expectations of many non-nuclear countries.

A year ago, at the first Scarborough conference on nuclear weapons, the Canadian Prime Minister discussed the ABM question and, without being categorical, cast doubt upon some of the arguments in favour of deploying this new weapons system. Since then, there have been significant developments in relation to this issue: there is substantial evidence of Soviet deployment of ABMs; there has been a widening of the public debate on ABMs in the U.S.A. and the West; there have been further advances in missile and related technology; tentative provision in the U.S. defence budget for some ABM production in the fiscal year 1967-68, and, possibly most important, we have witnessed an attempt by the United States to initiate a discussion of ABMs with the U.S.S.R. The Russians have suggested that the discussions should be broadened to include offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapons systems, and the United States has agreed to this. Thus the past year has provided us with considerable new information about the BMD issue. In these few minutes I want to set before you some tentative Canadian thoughts on this issue and to raise some questions.

First of all, it is probably quite clear from our deliberations here that we in Canada strongly support the United States initiative to interest the U.S.S.R. in discussing a moratorium on ABM deployment. We realize that the talks have scarcely begun and that the prospects for early agreement are not bright, but we think that the U.S.A. should continue to press the issue. We also appreciate that during this period of desultory and inconclusive diplomatic exchanges the U.S.S.R. has continued its deployment programme, but we do not believe that the U.S. deterrent, with its considerable superiority, is in immediate danger of losing its credibility. Finally, we realize that the Soviet Union has insisted that, in order to consider ABMs, the whole strategic balance must be taken into account; in our view, this demand need not be a negative consideration. In fact, we think that talks which encompass the whole strategic nuclear-weapons field might lead to the all-inclusive agreement for which the world has been waiting. Therefore we fully support the repeated refusal of the U.S. Administration to begin the deployment process until the possibilities of agreement with the Soviet Union have been exhausted.

But circumstances could change. Or, even in the existing situation, the U.S. Administration could begin to review its present stand against deployment. How would we in Canada view such a development? The question is hypothetical and as a politician I prefer not to hazard firm answers to hypothetical