

Table 13

<u>Modernized Soviet Forces</u>	
<u>Launcher ceiling 1250+</u>	<u>Warhead ceiling 4500</u>
150 SS-18 (10 warheads)	1500
100 SS-X-24 (10 warheads)	1000
500 SS-25 (1 warhead)	500
(750)	(3000)
48 SS-N-18 (7 warheads)	336
80 SS-N-20 (9 warheads)	720
64 SS-N-23 (7 warheads)	448
(192)	(1504)
Total 942	4504

Does mobility increase or decrease the stability of these forces? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the counter-force capabilities of both sides in the post-reduction period.

In this Section we have not applied the earlier calculations on counter-force to the US proposal, because the outcomes, as indicated in Table 8 and 9, are essentially unchanged.

It is nevertheless worth noting that, without modernization and with force reductions based on either the Soviet or American proposals, each side is left with many warheads which can be used to target the relatively few silos of the other side. Increasing the number of single warhead launchers reduces the counter-force problem, therefore, while adding mobility reduces it still further. Indeed, as was indicated earlier, the switch to mobile single warhead missiles makes counter-force attack so complex that the incentive to engage in pre-emptive, counter-force strikes is significantly reduced.

In sum, from an arms control perspective there is no obvious value to banning mobile, single warhead missiles unless verification problems are