

attempting to influence the role which the Roman Catholic Church is playing in the current ideological struggle". When the European Division was asked in the autumn of 1951 to list in order of importance possible new missions in Europe and the Middle East, it placed the Vatican in a tie with Spain for third or fourth place after Finland and Austria.

114. In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that when Turkey first expressed an interest in joining NATO, Canada had been opposed to the suggestion. The manner in which the Government found it necessary to retreat from that position illustrates the difficult situation in which Canada is placed when a major issue of defense policy is firmly advocated by the United States. On August 10, 1950, the Turkish Ambassador called on the Minister to make "preliminary feelers" about the attitude which Canada would take if Turkey applied for membership in NATO. After explaining that the considerations which in 1949 had prompted the Canadian Government to think that "the nations signatory to the Treaty should be limited, as far as possible, to the North Atlantic area, Mr. Pearson commented that the aggression in Korea and subsequent events had somewhat changed the picture, and had shown that the struggle against Communist would have to be waged on many more sectors than the North Atlantic. While pointing out that the admission of Turkey might make it difficult to refuse applications from less effective states in that area, he stated that if the United States, the United Kingdom and France had no objection to the admission of Turkey Canada would not impose a veto, but would indeed give sympathetic consideration to the application. Two weeks later the Ambassador called to present an aide-memoire formally applying for membership. Mr. Heeney repeated the assurances given by the Minister but added a cautionary statement that:

"The Turkish Government would certainly realize that the admission of Turkey was, up to a large extent, linked up with the admission of Greece and possibly of other countries, such as Iran, the admission of which might become a liability for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that the application of his country would have to be studied in that context...whatever the outcome of this request for admission, a way would certainly be found, within or without the Pact to strengthen the relations between NATO and Turkey".

In a memorandum at the time Mr. Leger commented that Turkey's admission would still further extend Canadian military commitments, and make more difficult the gradual attainment of the economic and social aspects of the Treaty which Canada had always considered important. As Ambassadors from other NATO countries called on the Department to inquire what line Canada was taking on the Turkish request Mr. Pearson decided on August 28 that the reply should be that there was a good deal for and against the Turkish proposal, that we would not oppose if the United States, the United Kingdom and France favoured it and that until their views were known we should not take "any firm position". Three days later it was learned that at the NATO Deputies' meeting in London the Chairman, Mr. Spofford, had referred to the Turkish application and given the view of the United States that "it would be undesirable for any North Atlantic country to give the Turks any indication of its position pending an exchange of views among all North Atlantic countries". This unexpected development necessitated the Department notifying all its missions in North Atlantic countries to avoid discussion of the question, or, if that were impossible, to make it clear that "Canada is not taking any firm position and will not take any, unless and until the attitude of the powers more directly concerned is known". At Ankara, where General Odium had been for some time reporting enthusiastically upon Turkey's