

debase the coinage. *Collective security* actually has a fighting chance of being implemented through the UN and a variety of other mechanisms. *Functionalism* makes more sense than it ever did, as an approach to managing global problems in pragmatic ways and in the process building the fibres of community. *The Canadian functional principle of representation* makes more sense than it ever did, as a formula for sensible burden-sharing, for reconciling the realities of disparate power and the need for universal participation.

And maybe even a sense of efficacy and vision by middle powers makes more sense than it ever did — with many new candidates and potential allies newly released from the bonds of divisive blocs — East and West, North and South. Most of these states share an interest in rule-based rather than power-based international relations, allowing for sensible integration to proceed but not by the fiat of the strongest. These countries tend as well to share a special capacity for peacekeeping and peace-making, which are obviously global growth industries.

No country can match Canada's established niche, its extraordinary connections (in North America, the G7, NATO and CSCE, Asia-Pacific, Commonwealth, Francophonie, and OAS), or its capacity for diplomatic leadership among a wider group of nations with a stake in working for a better kind of world order. It is also clear that most Canadians, in all parts of the country, at least tacitly accept that such a foreign policy protects their interests and projects their values. All available testimony from foreigners tends to corroborate the view that the traditional Canadian role in the world — together with its model of pluralism and tolerance at home — remains as constructive and important as ever, and if anything should be strengthened.

b. Foreign Policy Imperatives for a New Canada

Even though there is nothing on the international scene and little popular sentiment which argues for a basic change in Canada's international character and role, this satisfactory aspect of the *status quo* seems unlikely to prevail. It remains to ask how the range of constitutional changes now being hammered out among Canada's power-brokers and special interest groups would affect the global interests and values of the twenty-six million internationally-linked people of this country.

Whatever else happens in Canada's constitutional decisions, Canadians continue to depend vitally on an international climate of peace and