

and unreasonable view, which is unacceptable for small countries not possessing chemical weapons and having therefore no destruction facilities. Such countries (and they will form the majority of States parties to the future convention) need to have the right to address other States parties and the Consultative Committee in seeking know-how and/or assistance for the safe destruction of rarely-found old individual chemical weapons, rather than being submitted to verification concerning whether some kilograms of toxic material were really destroyed or illusory transferred to non-existing chemical arsenals. Besides, a number of delegations, including mine, have serious reservations with regard to a description in initial declarations of the exact locations of chemical weapons.

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In an article in "Le Monde" of 27 March 1984, the French journalist Michel Tatu has quoted Mr. Keyworth, Scientific Adviser to the White House and a supporter of the new ABM system, as having said: "It is difficult to have stability under conditions of parity". From there to say that the programme for developing ABM system will permit the establishment of a superiority is but small step. On the other hand, when an exhortation for developing the new weapons system was given at the highest level by the United States Government early last year, the response of the USSR, again at the highest level, was: "All attempts at achieving military superiority over the USSR are futile. The Soviet Union will never allow them to succeed". The net result is going to be, as in the case of the nuclear-arms race, neither superiority nor parity, but a new level of escalation of the arms race, both in outer space and on Earth, with all the grave implications which I have tried to outline.

A key question before this Conference is: Are these weapons verifiable, and, if not, is it feasible to ban them? The expert opinion on whether the control or elimination of these weapon systems is verifiable or not is by no means unanimous. For example, the National Council of the Federation of American Scientists has stated in its November 1983 report that "further deployment and testing of USSR's ASAT system will be easily verifiable. If there is a verification problem, it is with the far more sophisticated United States system". On the other hand, some experts have stated that the more sophisticated United States system is easier to verify. Another expert view is that an absolute ban, including the development of ASAT systems, would certainly pose verification problems, but such a ban is not critical. The banning of testing and deployment could really be monitored and will achieve the key objectives of preventing the further development and proliferation of these weapons.

In any event, the way military technology, including that for space-weapon systems, is developing, most of the new weapon systems are likely to become unverifiable sooner or later. According to the expert opinion, the new arms will be based on a technology that has been miniaturized to an extent which will not make them amenable to verification. To develop weapon systems which could beat verification has now become a principal challenge of the nations engaged in the arms race in the mistaken notion of seeking security by this means.

What is going to happen in that event? Will there be no arms limitation or disarmament simply because such measures cannot be verified? In the opinion of my delegation, that will only demonstrate how mistaken this absolute emphasis on verification has been and how this has been used as a pretext for not engaging in serious and genuine negotiations for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race and now the arms race in outer space.