

Proposal Abstract J93(A84)

1. Arms Control Problem:

- (a) Nuclear weapons - ballistic missiles
- (b) Regional arms control - outer space - ASATS

2. Verification Type:

- (a) Remote sensors
- (b) On-site inspection - selective
- (c) Complaints procedure - consultative commission

3. Source:

Krepon, Michael. Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.

4. Summary:

The author reviews the history of nuclear arms control negotiations and the debate between "two camps" in the United States - those who advocate reliance on weapons and those who advocate negotiations to serve US interests. He urges that the two camps narrow their differences and unite in pursuing an effective compliance strategy to deal with Soviet violations of arms control agreements.

In the past, Krepon argues, weapon strategists insisted on excessive verification requirements. For example, they demanded on-site inspection for a ban on MIRV deployments when verification could have been provided by sophisticated monitoring devices (p. 169). Both arms controllers and weapon strategists realize that completely effective detection methods are not possible. The two camps should unite in advocating "the judicious use of safeguards" (p. 171) to promote compliance with arms control agreements and to assist in developing a strategy for responding to Soviet violations. The US should first try to resolve compliance problems through diplomatic channels before adopting countermeasures. The Standing Consultative Commission is an important forum for resolving compliance issues, but higher level diplomatic exchanges may be necessary.

Safeguards should be negotiated early on in discussions, not after agreements have been concluded. Safeguards for an ASAT agreement could include restrictions on testing in order to limit operational capabilities or a complete ban on tests. The US could develop a production line which can be opened if the Soviet Union resumes ASAT testing.