16. In the result it was definitely settled at the Washington Conference that no development should be made east of the meridian of 110° east longitude. That decision barred the further development of Hong Kong, but permitted Great Britain to develop Singapore. As shown above, it was not by an oversight that the line was so drawn. The territory specified in Article 19 was a matter of prolonged consideration at Washington, and the other parties to the Treaty fully appreciated that Article 19 as finally drafted left Great Britain to develop Singapore as a Naval base.

17. South Africa did not send a representative to Washington, and the Treaty was signed on behalf of that Dominion by Mr. Balfour, so that these facts are possibly not familiar to General Smuts and the South African Government.

18. Finally, it should be mentioned that, in consequence of the agreements arrived at between the United States, Japan and this country at Washington, the naval situation resulting from the agreements was examined afresh by the Admiralty, and they produced a Memorandum (C.I.D. No. 176–C) showing how the naval policy of the British Empire had been affected by these treaties. In this Memorandum special consideration was given to the question of the development of Singapore, in view of the facts that any further development of Hong Kong would not be in accord with the terms of the Washington Treaty: that no British port in the Western Pacific is capable of serving as a base for a modern fleet, and that the United States are debarred from developing any naval base in the Western Pacific. The Admiralty therefore concluded that "for rapid concentration of the Fleet in the East it is essential that a secure base at Singapore can be counted on. The development of Singapore must take many years, even if substantial assistance is provided by the Dominions. The matter is therefore one of great urgency."

This Memorandum was considered and approved by His Majesty's Government, and copies were forwarded to the Dominions with a request for their remarks on the questions raised. The date of the despatch was the 23rd December.

19. The fifth paragraph of the Union Ministers' Minute contains the statement that "no expenditure on this project is provided during the year 1923/24 and only a very moderate expenditure thereafter during 1924/25." The despatch of the Secretary of State for the Colonies addressed to the Dominions on the 27th March, 1923, however, stated that, "no considerable expenditure will be incurred during the financial year 1923/24 and only a moderate expenditure during 1924/25." The despatch then went on to say that, "the provision made in the estimates for the financial year 1923/24 is 160,000*l*." To have held the question over for the formal approval of the Imperial Conference would have entailed the omission of this item from the Naval Estimates, and the postponement for a year of the commencement of a work which, as long ago as June 1921 had been described by Mr. Balfour as "one of the most pressing needs for Imperial defence" (paragraph 5 above), and which, as stated in paragraph 33 of C.I.D. Paper No. 176–C is regarded by the Naval Staff as "of great urgency."

20. From the above it is clear that the British Government, at any rate, never conceived it to be the intention of the Imperial Conference, and the Governments represented there, either before, during or after the Washington Conference, that their policy of creating a naval base at Singapore was in any way affected by any of the acts of that Conference. On the contrary, they made it clear at the Imperial Conference that even if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance continued, it would be necessary to carry out their naval programme, which included a base at Singapore; that they instructed their Delegates to the Washington Conference not to agree to anything which would interfere with the development of Singapore as a British naval base, and several times during the Conference reiterated this instruction; that their Delegates faithfully followed these instructions; that this attitude was communicated to and received the full support of the British Empire Delegation, on which all the Dominions except South Africa, as well as India, were represented by specially appointed Delegates.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W* 1,
June 30, 1923.

APPENDIX.

Copy of Despatch from His Royal Highness the Governor-General of the Union of South Africa to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

My Lord Duke, *Governor-General's Office, Cape Town, May* 18, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Grace herewith, with reference to your despatch Dominions No. 119, Secret, of the 27th March, 1923, the document mentioned below (enclosure), on the subject of the establishment of a naval base at Singapore.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR FREDERICK,
Governor-General.

Minute, dated May 18, 1923, *signed on behalf of the South African Government by General Smuts.*

Minute No. 360. *Prime Minister's Office, May* 18, 1923.

MINISTERS have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Royal Highness the Governor-General's Minute No. 2/1894 of the 20th April, transmitting a copy of the Secretary of State's despatch No. 119* of the 27th March, on the subject of the expenditure of £11,000,000 upon the establishment of a Naval base at Singapore, such expenditure to be extended over a period of years and without prejudice to any decisions of the forthcoming Imperial Conference.

Ministers desire to take this opportunity of putting on record their views in this matter, and to request that their views may be communicated to the other Dominions for their information.

One of the most beneficent results of the Washington Conference was the signature of the Quadruple Pacific Treaty which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance without disturbing the friendly relations between Great Britain and Japan. The result of the agreement was to minimise for the duration of the pact any danger of war in the Pacific Ocean, and the fact that America joined in this pact at once altered the conditions under which a base at Singapore was considered at the Prime Ministers' Conference in 1921. A reconsideration of the whole Naval policy of the British Empire is therefore rendered necessary.

Attention is drawn to the resolution† adopted in respect of this matter under the heading Imperial Defence (Naval) at the Conference held in London in 1921, when it was resolved that any definite decision in regard to Naval Defence or the manner of co-operation should be deferred until after the Conference at Washington.

Ministers regret that any statements should have been made on the subject of Singapore, in view of the imminence of the Prime Ministers' Conference, especially having in mind the fact that no expenditure on this project is provided during the year 1923/24, and only a very moderate expenditure thereafter during 1924/25.

A great fortified base at Singapore may, in its effect on Japanese opinion, produce far-reaching reactions for the foreign policy, as well as for the Naval policy, of the Empire; and the whole subject, in all its possible bearings, should have received the careful attention of the Imperial Conference before a decision on any detail was announced.

The last review of the Naval position is contained in the Memorandum‡ of the Committee of Imperial Defence, dated the 28th July, 1922, and, if there has been any further development in the views of the Admiralty, Ministers trust that His Majesty's Government will prepare and issue for their consideration a fresh appreciation of the world Naval position, so that, in coming to the Conference in October, they may be advised in advance of the views that the Admiralty may submit.

(Signed) J. C. SMUTS.

* C.I.D. No. 189–C. † Paper No. E–55. ‡ C.I.D. No. 176–C.

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