

altitude is from 40,000 to 50,000 feet. Therefore, to intercept them, we must have an aeroplane which can climb to those altitudes and fly at and maintain speeds considerably in excess of that of sound. Neither of the two fighters we have at the present time can do this, and they would be practically useless as effective barriers to such bombers.

The United Kingdom and the United States now have these delta-winged craft. How long will it be before Russia has them? We cannot safely count on over five years. What are we doing to design and construct a fighter with the characteristics necessary for successful combat? If our sole aim in the air is to be protective, surely it is fundamental that we should have some idea of what sort of protectors we are going to have. Is it not the function of any defence committee to be informed—yes, to demand to be informed—about such a basic matter?

I feel that no parliament can divest itself of the responsibility for national defence. The old days of the professional soldier are over. Today every citizen is part of the defence of his country, and the better he is informed the more effective he can be. These basic problems therefore must be discussed and studied.

I suggest that men like Air Marshal Douglas Smith, the air member for technical services, with his engine and airframe specialists, and Dr. J. J. Green, as well as Dr. Solandt, could most profitably come before the committee.

The design, construction and production of such a plane with a mach. rating of 1.3 to 1.5 is a difficult problem because it will require an entirely new profile and new engines. It could possibly take up to eight years to get one into production. We have known of the Avro 698 probably for at least two years, that is if there is any liaison between the R.A.F. and the R.C.A.F. Have these two years been wasted, and the job of providing a counter to this aircraft not yet begun?

I mention these figures about aircraft because they strike at the very fundamentals of the job of providing national defence for this country. If the committee on national defence is to do anything, it must see that the country gets adequate national defence. Otherwise of what use at all is it? Why should it be called? If it is to see that we get adequate national defence it must deal with these problems—technical ones, if you like—such as the basic one of whether we can produce aircraft which will do the job of protecting us and our allies from attack.

In the committee we have to see whether this is being done. There is no question of security. The people of Canada must understand the difficulties of the job ahead. We

Committee on Defence Expenditure

have been given too much soothing syrup in the past. We have been treated with a sort of continuous effusion of Dr. Pangloss that everything was perfect in this most perfect of all worlds. If the Currie report has done nothing else, it has opened the eyes of the Canadian people at least to the dangers of national defence and the problems which lie ahead. There should be no excuse for any committee on national defence not going into these problems.

Mr. Harris: Who is delaying it?

Mr. Adamson: The minister is delaying it by the device of putting the Currie report before the committee on national defence. He is delaying it every single day, as we were delayed last year in the committee.

I now come to another question which must be given consideration and must be decided. I refer to the question of ordnance. The policy followed has been to divest ourselves of United Kingdom type artillery, in particular the 25-pounder. We were told that, for the sake of unification of arms, we were to send our 25-pounders to NATO countries, which we did, and to be supplied with United States 105 millimeter guns. We divested ourselves of the 25-pounders—enough for three divisions, I think. When our troops went to Korea, because of United States policy we found that there was a critical shortage of ammunition. Instead of our own gunners having our own guns and our own supply lines for ammunition, we found ourselves to be hostages to United States policy. The tragic reports of two rounds per day per gun, which have been authenticated over and over again, are a result of this policy.

Mr. Knowles: Five o'clock, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Adamson: I shall be through with this matter in just a minute, Mr. Speaker. This question of artillery and the question of the unification of arms were decided by the government without any discussion with the committee and, in my opinion, it has led to tragic results.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It being five o'clock, the house will proceed to the consideration of private and public bills.

PRIVATE BILLS

Mr. Deputy Speaker: On the order paper I note that, as items No. 45 and No. 46, there are two bills which have been reported by a standing committee of the house. Shall I take the two in the same motion? Is it agreed that the two bills, one respecting Interprovincial Pipe Line Company and the other to incorporate Peace River Transmission