

## Conclusions: Arms Control and Military Reform

The CFE Treaty cannot deliver significantly greater stability by way of even lower force levels. Moreover, the fact of NATO enlargement — and to a lesser extent EU expansion — has replaced the conditions which led to the need for a state and bloc-centered conventional arms treaty in the first place.<sup>40</sup> In 1997 NATO concluded the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security* with Moscow and the *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership* with Kiev and in both instances NATO was acknowledged as a positive force for peace and stability in Europe.<sup>41</sup> More to the point, the Alliance has become the *principal* vehicle of security in Europe. In light of its *New Strategic Concept*, its continued enlargement, and the parallel development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by an enlarged EU — in each case the maintenance of rapid reaction forces in a new age of expeditionary warfare and regional crisis being a central objective — Western expansion into the former Soviet sphere of interest has been the phenomenon of the past decade, and there is presently no alternative to NATO as Europe's fire brigade.<sup>42</sup> Given that force levels in Europe today are lower than at any time since World War II, European governments concerned with enhancing security employ the Treaty's politically-binding CSBMs as the basis for negotiating bilateral agreements to improve relations over regional and local disputes which cannot be answered by pan-European multilateral approaches. To cite an example, Hungary and Romania have concluded bilateral aerial surveillance regimes similar to the Open Skies Treaty.<sup>43</sup>

The Alliance's changing role can and should be supplemented by more overarching structures such as the PFP and the OSCE. There is no reason why many of the highly-advanced standards of reassurance applied within NATO cannot be extended in the name of mutual benefit to the entire CFE block and *beyond* to Lord Roberston's Ark of Security. In NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) arms control and military are closely related. The Alliance has encouraged both oversized and emerging militaries to concentrate on "niche area" investments in small but professional forces well-suited to multilateral crisis-management and peace support operations.<sup>44</sup> Meanwhile, the role of arms control is itself evolving from a feature of deliberate conflict-prevention diplomacy to a tool of conflict containment.<sup>45</sup> The obvious goal for revamped CFE norms is to provide comprehensive extended reassurance to non-NATO CFE signatories, Russia the most important among them. These must involve detailed provisions for cooperative engagement, under specified circumstances, of operational forces of NATO, non-NATO CFE states and, where possible, non-CFE states for enhancing transparency and confidence beyond the level achieved through such post-Cold War mechanisms as the Partnership for Peace. The enlargement of Atlantic Alliance and the adaptation of CFE norms to new security conditions in Eurasia and the Mediterranean should be one and the same process.

Since the end of the Cold War Europe has achieved a greater security from the risk of large scale conventional warfare than at any time since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The CFE Treaty's role in diminishing this threat makes it by any measure an extraordinary success. Countries with an historic interest in arms control have an interest in the extension of CFE norms beyond the treaty's present area of application. For Canada, a NATO state with an interest in arms control and history in peace-support missions, this is doubly important. As Canada attempts to improve its niche defense capabilities, both to rectify years of neglect in defence spending and to enhance its contribution to NATO's efforts in combating new security threats on the European periphery, it should be Canadian policy to insist that the Alliance press non-NATO and non-CFE states to adopt CFE norms.

<sup>40</sup> Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe*, pp.5-9.

<sup>41</sup> *The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, <http://www.usia.gov/products/washfile/eu.shtml> ; *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/ukrchrt.htm>

<sup>42</sup> Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe*, pp.14-15; Raymond A. Millen, "Pax NATO: The Opportunities of Enlargement," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2002.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.10-11.

<sup>44</sup> Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp.131-145.

<sup>45</sup> Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe*, pp.1-2.