

Goldring concludes that the analysis of light weapons proliferation remains at a "very early stage" (p. 7). She cautions against being content to work towards increased transparency, advocating instead a push for real progress on the control of light weapons proliferation.

Table 1 is a list of selected portable anti-tank weapons. Table 2 is a list of selected portable anti-aircraft weapons. Each of these tables includes the name of the weapon, the country of origin, and notes on the technology (Table 2 also includes a section "Evidence of Use"). Table 3 is a list of issues affecting proposals for control.

- 607.** Greene, Owen. "Developing Regimes to Promote Transparency, Accountability and Restraint in Light Weapons Transfers." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

Greene emphasizes that attempts to control light weapons can only be successful in the medium to long term. A theme running through the paper is that "...the development of international norms and principles relating to light weapons, without which coordinated and sustained international policy responses is unlikely, is in practice intimately related to efforts to agree and implement focused policy proposals" (p. 1).

He stresses the importance of developing potentially negotiable proposals. Some success has been achieved in recent years in raising the profile of the problems associated with light weapons proliferation. However, the present momentum will be lost if influential policy makers are not convinced that progress can be made. He notes several obstacles to concrete action:

- 1) light weapons include a huge range of weapons;
- 2) these weapons are traded extensively throughout the world;
- 3) these weapons are not subject to an international norm which prohibits their proliferation.

Despite these obstacles, there are several avenues available for action. First, cooperation controls or bans, such as the Inhumane Weapons Convention, could be created to address light weapons. Second, transparency measures, for example the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, could be extended to include light weapons. Greene cautions against this approach, advocating the creation of a separate register for light weapons. Finally, supplier regimes could be used to complement the first two options.

Greene suggests the creation of new international transparency, review or control regimes for light weapons. Several proposals are described:

- 1) provide lists of weapons production facilities of each state;
- 2) establish a "pledge and review" process to promote effective national controls;
- 3) destroy surplus stocks rather than sell them;
- 4) promote accountability for producers for the way in which weapons are used;
- 5) agree to maintain "firebreaks" (i.e., agree on what weapons should only be available to police and armed forces).

He concludes that these and other areas provide avenues where progress can be made in controlling the spread of light weapons.

- 608.** Husbands, Jo L. "Background Note." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

This paper is excerpted from a chapter included in J. Boutwell, et al, eds., *Lethal Commerce* [Serial No. 502]. In this version, Husbands incorporates new research into her argument that arms control efforts must focus on the conflicts in which the weapons are being used.

Basic questions must be answered before embarking on any attempt to control light weapons proliferation: How much to try to control? What are the goals of controls? What will one consider success? In each situation, the policy options available will be determined by the stage of the conflict. Before one begins, or in its early stages, benefits can be derived from monitoring arms shipments to the area. While the conflict is under way, progress towards peace can be made by using an arms embargo. When the fighting is over, provisions must be made for disarmament and demobilization to limit the chances of renewed fighting or of weapons being sold as surplus to fuel another conflict.