

consequences among states. Arms control has generally been defined in military-strategic terms and thus deals with weapons intended for use by the military forces of the world on behalf of the governments or states that they represent. Domestic lawlessness on the other hand has by and large been viewed as the legislative, police and justice responsibility of individual states. This does not mean that international cooperation is not applicable to lawlessness or criminal activity where it involves light weapons or anything else for that matter. But it equally does not necessarily imply that light weapons used in criminal activities are an arms control issue in the classical sense. However, much of the literature on light weapons and small arms as a proliferation issue tends not to treat the issues of law and order and international and regional security separately. Law and order or criminality is sometimes intermingled with organized political violence in the context of light weapons proliferation which thus contributes to the complexity of the issue as an arms control or proliferation matter. One must ask the question where does "arms control" or "non-proliferation"⁸ within the realm of international security end, and where does "firearms regulation and enforcement" within the realm of domestic law and order begin? If the definition remains ill defined there will be regime confusion, differing objectives and many more actors involved which could slow or undermine cooperation and eventually constrain any potential successes in controlling light weapons proliferation. Some might argue that it is a humanitarian issue not a security issue and point to land mines as a worthy example of arms control seeking bans on humanitarian grounds. The humanitarian aspect is not the question, arguably poison gas, dum-dum bullets and nuclear weapons were humanitarian issues and not just international security issues. What is clear about those weapons and land mines is that they were designed for and used by the armed forces of a state in pursuit of a state's interest or were used by organized militarily armed political groups against the state and were thus legitimate security concerns. It is obvious that light weapons proliferation as discussed in much of the literature sometimes falls into a large grey area. It is also apparent that the issue is by-and-large avoided in that same literature -- an issue that needs more research.

A suggested approach to compartmentalizing conflict issues within the context of light weapons as an arms control issue, is to define lethal or violent conflict (threatened or actual) as either **criminal** -- which implies the use of firearms for personal gain or satisfaction only, and **political** -- which will encompass all the various reasons for intrastate conflict such as ethnic, language, religion and ideology. It is acknowledged that criminal activity may overlap into political conflict where it is done to obtain money for the cause or where there are criminal elements at work within the political framework of a conflict. Light weapons, particularly small arms, stands firmly in both the areas of criminal and political violence as a

⁸ See David Mutimer "Non-Proliferation and International Security." in *Control But Verify: Verification and the New Non-Proliferation Agenda*. (York University, 1994), 10. Mutimer defines proliferation within an agreed Canadian context as the diffusion of weapons, associated technologies and expertise that produces an adverse effect on local, regional or global security and stability". This definition implies military security but it can mean security in the broadest sense. Again it would be useful to define weapons.