

These efforts stalemated due principally to fundamental disagreement on the tough issue of the need for effective verification of a CW ban and particularly Soviet intransigence on questions relating to on-site inspections. Negotiations were further complicated by our weakness in this area compared to the Soviets, who possessed a decisive military advantage and had little arms control incentive in the face of the large asymmetry in chemical warfare capabilities. The Soviets did, however, have an interest in negotiations as long as it impeded improvement of United States deterrent capabilities.

Requirements for Deterrence

In view of the over-all military balance between the United States and the Soviets, we cannot rely on other components of our military capabilities to deter chemical warfare. Consequently, to deter, we find we need to improve our CW capabilities sufficiently to deny the Soviets the significant military advantage they would gain from using chemical weapons. Improving our defences against chemical weapons is a necessary, but not sufficient, step to deny the Soviets such an advantage.

Improved defences can save lives, reduce casualties and reduce — but not eliminate — significant degradation of military performance in a chemically contaminated environment. The needed protective equipment reduces mobility, slows operations and makes many tasks difficult or impossible. Reliance solely on improved defences would leave the initiators of chemical warfare largely free to operate without the constraints imposed by protection; thus yielding them a major advantage and encouraging the use of chemical weapons.

Therefore, in addition to improving our defences we must maintain a capability to retaliate with chemical weapons, to reduce the incentive to the enemy's first use, since he would also have to operate with the encumbrance of protective equipment. However, our current chemical weapon stockpile (which will ultimately be destroyed) is inadequate to provide an effective deterrent. Most of the current stockpile is not usable because it is stored in bulk containers. Much of the remainder is in ammunition for weapons that have been or will be phased out of service. The current stockpile is also lacking in weapons that can be used against the rear echelons of attacking forces. Finally, the current stockpile presents logistical problems, due to the elaborate safety precautions required in transport, which further restrict its utility.

Programme Objectives and Requirements

It is the objective of the United States chemical warfare programme to improve defensive and retaliatory capabilities to deter CW attack and to provide incentive and gain leverage in arms control negotiations.

Recent United States Government programme requests include the following:

- The Carter Administration's CW programmes increased from \$111 million in FY 1978 to \$239 million in FY 1981, to improve defences against chemical warfare.
- In 1981 the new Administration's FY 1981 Defense Supplemental request included \$20 million to purchase and install the equipment required to complete the binary production facility authorized and appropriated by the previous Congress.
- The FY 1982 Budget request included \$532 million for chemical warfare programmes, primarily for defence, but no funds for the production of weapons.