

Third, it seems probable that in the course of a Canadian deployment of an SBR with limited capability (although the same argument applies to NWS), the United States will opt to develop the systems now being explored in ADI, and also decide to proceed to a more powerful space-based system. At that point the NWS would become a redundant system, and a Canadian SBR at best a marginal contribution to bilateral efforts at continental surveillance.

In considering the merits of this proposal, therefore, it is clear that, essentially, the case for SBR depends primarily on the importance of national surveillance in the Arctic rather than on the maintenance of a shared air defence with the United States. In this sense it may be seen as an alternative to the proposal that the North Warning System be relocated farther North to permit extensive coverage of the Canadian Arctic. If the total cost (perhaps in the vicinity of \$1.5 billion) of a relocated NWS or a similar system on the true periphery of Canada were compared with space-based radar, it appears that the latter might provide a sounder long-run solution to national surveillance in the Arctic. Political reality, however, dictates otherwise. The commitment to the first phase of the NWS has been agreed by both parties; and in contrast to the NWS agreement, there could be no expectation that the USAF would want to contribute to a modest, largely Canadian SBR which held out no possibility of detecting cruise missiles. There is, however, a further prospect. Should the US Congress choose not to fund phase two of NWS (the gap filler radars), or the Administration not request the funding, the question of northern surveillance would need to be reconsidered. At that point, the case for a national, limited purpose SBR would need to be fully investigated.