

responsibility for supervising the activities of the Organization); and

- a Technical Secretariat headed by a Director-General.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is estimated to cost about US \$75 million per year. It will be financed on the basis of assessed contributions by signatories.

The main component of the Organization's Technical Secretariat will be the Inspectorate responsible for verifying compliance with the Convention. The CWC's verification provisions are the most rigorous ever developed in a multilateral agreement. They allow the Organization to confirm the destruction of chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles and CW production facilities, to monitor closely any continuing permitted production of certain toxic chemicals, to gather information about the global chemical industry, and, when requested by States Parties, to carry out short-notice "challenge" inspections.

Canada has not produced chemical warfare agents since the Second World War and has since destroyed its CW stockpiles. The Canadian chemical industry will be subject to routine monitoring under the Convention. The "National Authority," which the Convention requires be established in each ratifying state as the contact point for the international Organization, will be set up within an existing federal government department. ■

## The CWC in Summary

Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) establishes a complete ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons (CW), and calls for the destruction of all CW stocks and CW production facilities within a specified period. Article I also obliges States Parties that have abandoned CW on another State Party's territory to assume joint responsibility for destroying those stocks.

Articles IV and V set out detailed verification measures for the destruction of CW stocks and production facilities. Complete destruction is to be achieved within 10 years. However, because some states might have economic problems organiz-

## Canada Welcomes START II

Canada welcomed the signing of the Second Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) by then-US President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3.

"START II represents the single greatest reduction in destructive power ever mandated by an arms control treaty," said External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall. "Canada is delighted that the new spirit of cooperation between former adversaries has resulted in such a tangible gain for world security."

START II calls for massive reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and the Russian Federation, to a level of between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003. This amounts to a cut of roughly 70 percent from current levels. Heavy, land-based multiple-warhead missiles, generally regarded as the most destabilizing, will be eliminated entirely by both parties.

Mrs. McDougall called on other countries of the former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) to honour their arms reduction commitments. In particular, she urged those states to fully implement their undertakings with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "START II constitutes a significant boost for the nuclear non-proliferation process. Its signing takes on even greater significance as we move towards the NPT review and extension conference in 1995," the Minister added.

ing a destruction program, the Convention allows for an extension of this period of up to five more years.

For similar reasons, Article V also permits States Parties to convert to permissible civilian use — rather than destroy — certain production facilities. This can be done only under strict conditions designed to prevent possible re-conversion to CW use. In both instances, additional verification measures will be applied to prevent cheating.

As a safeguard against clandestine CW production, Article VI specifies a comprehensive and graduated regime for routine monitoring of government CW-related production activities and of the global chemical industry. Monitoring will be carried out through national declarations supplemented by international on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The basis of the regime is set out in three schedules (lists) of toxic chemicals annexed to the CWC. Facilities producing chemicals listed on Schedule 1 (which covers agents that *have* been used as chemical weapons) for certain approved purposes, such as developing protective equipment or for medical research, will be subject to the most rigorous verification measures. Facilities producing Schedule 2 (toxic chemicals that *could* be used as chemical weapons and their precursors) or Schedule 3 (toxic chemicals that *might* be used as chemical weapons) chemicals,

will be subject to progressively less rigorous measures. All other chemical production facilities deemed relevant to the Convention — estimated to number in the tens of thousands worldwide — will be liable to occasional random inspection.

Article IX establishes a system for short-notice "challenge" inspections. Under this provision, any State Party's facility or site can be inspected if another State Party has reason to believe that the site is engaged in activities incompatible with the obligations and goals of the Convention. The "challenged" state will not be able to refuse such inspections; it must allow the Organization's inspection team access to such sites, although there are several measures available to a State Party to protect (for national security or other reasons) activities it considers unrelated to the challenge or to the scope of the Convention.

Article XII allows the Organization to require a State Party deemed not to be in full compliance with the Convention to take remedial action. In the event that the offending state fails to do so, the Organization can apply a number of penalties, including voluntary sanctions.

In recognition of the UN Security Council's paramount responsibility for matters affecting international peace and security, cases of particular gravity are to be referred to the Security Council for possible further (mandatory) action under the UN Charter. ■