

legislative authority to pass it. In that case there was one point in controversy: Had Parliament power to pass a general temperance law? and the Judicial Board says that it cannot be contended that if the Legislatures could not pass a temperance Act, Parliament must be able to do so. There must be jurisdiction over the temperance question somewhere—if not in the Legislature, then in Parliament. That is quite simple and quite true, and the Privy Council did not add to that proposition, a statement that every Act, however multifarious or peculiar, must be solely in one jurisdiction or the other; nor did they say that if the Legislature of Ontario could not pass an Act to have operation in Quebec; that therefore Parliament could pass that identical Act.

The pure gold is shewn by the analyst at page 60. He claims to have established several propositions. This is the first:—"That the Dominion Parliament and the Local Legislatures, have not, as has been claimed, concurrent powers, but that Parliament has the dominant, and the Local Legislatures, the subordinate power." This is about as far wrong as he could go. It is worse than wrong, for it shews that the true statement of the case had never occurred to the writer. He decides between concurrent power and a dominant and subordinate relationship. Neither is correct. We do not think that the existence of concurrent power has ever been suggested even by a Privy Councillor; and Mr. Justice Loranger, (whose letters upon the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, have been analysed into pure stupidity,) is much more nearly accurate than his critic, when he says:—"In the reciprocal sphere of their authority thus recognized, there exists no superiority in favor of Parliament over the Provinces, but, subject to Imperial sovereignty, these Provinces are quasi-sovereign within their respective spheres, and there is absolute equality between them." This statement is also defective, for there is not, and can be no equality. An orange may be divided equally, but it is impossible to separate legislative power into moieties. No common denominator can be applied. If "Insolvency"