

that act. His resolution in this case has virtually another resolution within it. He never attempts to make his resolution of to-day cover the subjective energy or to-morrow; because he knows the subjective energy of one moment will not respond to the subjective resolution of another moment. He leaves its response to the resolution of to-morrow—that is, to the one included in his general one of to-day.

It is quite plain, then, that every resolution is carried into effect by the subjective act, whether it precedes the subjective act or is conjoined with it.

In the latter case, the response of the subjective energy is immediate and certain; and in the former case, so long as the main resolution remains unchanged, the resolution included within it, and the response of subjective energy attached to the included resolution, are equally certain.

If the time resolved on for the act is allowed to pass without its being done, it is because either the resolution to do it has been changed or it has been forgotten.

It follows, then, from the foregoing, that when we have gained the subjective resolution we have gained the subjective act, and all that we can really possess. The subjective resolution is thus the key to the act.

There is really little if anything more than what we have already said to describe about the subjective act, so far as it enters the sphere of moral or mental phenomena. The subjective energy is a power that controls alike our mental or our physical operations; and it is a power, in all cases, subject and responsive to the subjective resolution.

The subject or ego has only to resolve that the powers of his mind shall act in a certain way, and they immediately respond by doing as he pleases; so also in regard to the powers of his body: when he resolves that they shall move, they do so immediately and spontaneously in accordance with his behest. Of course this statement holds true only of those powers of mind or body that are under the control of the will.

All the subjective energies of the mind, as well as of the body, are then alike responsive to the subjective resolution; and when we have followed the subjective resolution to its conjunction with the subjective act or energy, we have seen about all of the will and its operations that can be seen.

Having concluded our introductory analysis of the Will, we shall now proceed to discuss more largely the means and methods by which it operates; in other words, the means and methods by which a subjective resolution is aroused to perform a subjective act. Every rational creature resolves or consents from impulses or motives, just as every piece of machinery never goes of itself, but is impelled from some motive power. It is not, however, the impulse of fate that impels the human will; and here the analogy fails between man and the piece of machinery referred to. In the case of the machinery, it is blind compulsive force, irrespective of any resolution or choice in the matter. In man's case, the force is not compulsory at all.

The motive may be persuasive and urgent in its appeals to his resolution or choice, but it never takes the objective energy under its direct control. It can only act and seek its appropriate gratification through the medium of his own resolution. The Ego is still free whether to consent to or refuse its petition, however urgent; unless it is the motive most agreeable to his resolution or choice, which of course he is not able to refuse; for if he were so, he would at once be able to resolve independent of all motives; and this would render him no longer a rational creature.

This would be no liberty at all, but only destruction of man's nature.

We submit the following formula:—

The First refers to the subjective act.

The Ego, or subject, is always free in the sense of having liberty to act in accordance with his resolution or choice—that is, he is free in the sense that his act is the result of his own resolution.

The Second and others refer to the subjective resolution.

The Ego, or subject, is always free in the sense of being able to resolve in accordance with a strong motive when none oppose it, and with the strongest class of motives when another class oppose them—that is, he is always free or able to resolve in accordance with the motives that influence him most.

But he is never free in the sense of being able to resolve against a strong motive with none opposing it, or against the stronger class of motives when opposed to a weaker class—that is, he is never free or able to resolve contrary to the motives that influence him most.

Again, he is never free in the sense of being able to resolve independent of motives. Still further, as all motives or subjective feelings are of a gratificatory or pacificatory nature, they being strong just as their impulses are desirable or agreeable, it follows, then, that the subject is always free to resolve in accordance with what is desirable or agreeable to