

points. It was pointed out to General Burns, however, that the vagueness of the neutral formula, presumably deliberate, enabled the U.S.A. in the process of negotiation to advance interpretations in their favour.

As Burns saw it, both sides were attempting to assert preconditions to the acceptance of the 8-power formula as a basis for further talks: the Russians were insisting on a U.S.A. undertaking not to test while negotiations were going on; the U.S.A. were insisting on the written acceptance of principles going beyond the 8-power formula as it stands. In the discussion with Burns it was agreed that if this matter came up in plenary today he might profitably suggest, if the opportunity offered, that negotiations should proceed without preconditions on either side, merely on the understanding that the formula had to be explored if it was to be made more precise.

General Burns saw no advantage at this moment in making further approaches or representations in Washington. We put this point to him in view of a suggestion made by the Minister by telephone last night that such a move might be timely.¹⁹

R. C[AMPBELL]

30.

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*Le conseiller du Gouvernement canadien en matière du désarmement
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Advisor to Government of Canada on Disarmament
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 724

Geneva, April 20, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIMMEDIATE.

Repeat for Information: Washington, Permis New York, NATO Paris, Paris, London, Bonn, Rome (OpImmediate), CCOS (JS/DSS) Ottawa (OpImmediate) from Ottawa.

By Bag Moscow from London

EIGHT-NATION MEMO – NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

Plenary Committee held a long meeting today to hear the nuclear powers state their position in regard to negotiating on the basis of the 8-Nation memorandum. A full report will follow. Present message is an attempt to indicate briefly the position reached and the prospects for further negotiations.

2. Representatives of the three nuclear powers, after considerable argument and questioning, have all agreed to accept the 8-Nation memorandum as the basis for negotiations, though not repeat not the exclusive basis. An agreed compromise cannot repeat not result if the Soviets adhere to their position of November 28, 1961 and USA/UK adhere to their draft treaty of April 18, 1961.²⁰ It would seem that to reach a compromise the USA and UK will have to be content with considerably less control apparatus and a modification of their position on on-site inspections. This will require governmental decision and a fresh reappraisal.

¹⁹ Note marginale :/Marginal note:
Noted. N.A. R[obertson]

²⁰ Voir/See Volume 28, documents 110, 137; *Documents on Disarmament, 1961* (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962), pp. 82-126, 659-664, 674-677.