

the character of their contents was more correctly appreciated.

There is little room for doubt, these letters were written with a full knowledge and determination to take advantage of the principles of British diplomacy and the clerical methods of the Foreign Office ; in the archives of which it must be known such letters are put on record without being stigmatized by any comment on the nature of their contents, as : "This is a lie, the writer knows we have repudiated this assumption again and again." "This statement is not borne out by the facts ; under certain conditions it might be so, and it is our business to be certain such conditions shall not become established." There appear to be several of these letters in the "Appx. Br. Case," not directly addressed to the British Minister and demanding an answer that would be placed on record with them. The wonder is they should have been placed on record at all, or be accepted by any person of observant and logical habits as having the slightest value as evidence, except perhaps, of the writer's own wishes. The effect of such unbalanced assertions upon the legal mind is shown in Mr. Aylesworth's comment : "From the time of Count Nesselrode's refusal to treat as to reciprocal trading rights elsewhere than in the *lisière* and Mr. Canning's acquiescence in such refusal, no further negotiations whatever on that subject took place." Of course not. Canning's reply was, in effect, that if Russia would not sign the treaty in the form proposed Britain was prepared to assert her rights by force. What evidence is there to show that the "establishment" Count Nesselrode was so anxious should not be at the mercy of Great Britain, existed anywhere but in his hopes of the future ? The more insistent the Russian pretensions the more determined British Ministers would be to limit their extension either in area or duration. The protection to Russian commercial interests was assured, not by ceding large areas to her rule, but by the undertaking that British subjects should not settle within the limits assigned to Russian trade. This, as well as the other conditions "on which it was impossible Russia should give way,"—till the right kind of pressure was applied—were such