consideration of a promise to pay, and an extension of time for payment, a release of one-half the amount of such taxes was given. He was afterwards nominated and elected as an alderman.

Held, that this agreement came within the disqualification clause of the Municipal Clauses Act.

Held, further, that as in this case the defendant had acted bonâ fide, the court would exercise its discretion under the Supreme Court Act to relieve against the penalty.

Elliott, K.C., for defendant, appellant. *Higgins* and *Morphy*, for plaintiff, respondent.

Clement, J.] REX *v.* RULOFSON. [Oct. 19.

Perjury—"Judicial proceeding."

An examination ordered by a judge to be taken before the registrar of the court ceases to be a "judicial proceeding" as defined by Crim. Code s. 171 (2) of Criminal Code, if the registrar after administering the oath leaves the room and the examination is proceeded with in his absence.

A false statement under oath made by a witness at such an examination, but in the absence of the registrar as aforesaid, is not perjury as defined by s. 170 of the Criminal Code: *Queen* v. *Lloyd* (1887) 56 L.J.M.C. 119 followed.

The learned judge directed the jury to bring in a verdict in favour of the prisoner.

Taylor, K.C., for Crown. *Craig* and *J. A. Russell*, for prisoner.

Flotsam and Jetsam.

The attempt of an ex-convict to get even with the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia by burning down the learned judge's house must be strongly deprecated. The fact that the Chief Justice was away when the ex-convict made the attempt renders the act a positively ungentlemanly one. This language may seem harsh, but it can be justified.—(Exch.). As a breach of good manners this was almost as objectionable as the action of the prisoner who ended the moral essay of the magistrate who was passing sentence upon him by threatening to shy his boot at the "old 'un's nob," if he didn't stop.