

of language. This is a political game for them. It does not imply their opening of the country because, like previous dynasties, especially the last dynasty which was the Ching dynasty, they are very skillful in isolating the foreigner. I can speak with some experience on this. The diplomats in Peking missions of friendly countries with which China has intimate relations—as intimate as their relations are with anybody—are excluded, restricted and confined. This is the traditional Chinese way of dealing with foreigners. It conforms to their basic psychological reaction to the foreigner. This would happen to a Canadian mission. We would be restricted and isolated in the same way. It does not imply opening their doors to western influence.

Mr. McINTOSH: May I ask a supplementary question of Mr. Andras? What was the humiliation by the Western powers you referred to which took place during the 100 years before 1949.

Mr. TAYLOR: Roughly from 1840, the period of the so-called Opium Wars, the Western powers, with Britain in the lead, the United States rather in the rear and countries like France, Germany and Czarist Russia very much involved, forced themselves militarily and politically on China, first in the south and the coastal port areas, in Canton especially, and then moved in with military expeditions right into Peking, which included the sacking of the summer palace. These were primarily commercially inspired incursions. We introduced opium to the Chinese—that is one of the benefits of Western civilization we brought to them. We, Westerners in general, forced them to accept what they quite accurately called unequal treaties, whereby vast areas of their coastal ports, such as Shanghai, Amoy and Canton, were restricted to the foreigner, where foreign law ran, and when a foreigner killed a Chinese, he was tried by a foreign court. The record is not good. At the same time the Chinese were very provocative; there is no doubt about this. They had different ideas about how to deal with the foreigner from our ideas about how we should be dealt with, but it was their country we went into.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, I am afraid, I am going to have to be more restrictive. Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. ANDRAS: Am I now cut off, Mr. Chairman?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I join Mr. Walker and others in expressing appreciation for the time you have given us this morning.

In the context of your understanding and the experience you have had in China, would you care to let your mind wander for just a moment and express an opinion as to what the likely reaction of China might be to our present transformation, for want of another word, within our defence structure—the role that we might appear to be pursuing, that of an instrument of peacekeeping, peace restoration, a tool of those powers in the world that might see fit to use us if that is required.

Mr. TAYLOR: I had not thought of that but, speaking off the top of my head. I would say that if the Chinese were moved to comment on our, as you say, emergence as a peacekeeping power and our increasing emphasis on peacekeeping, they would say that this is done in the service of the United Nations, which it is primarily, and they would interpret this in the light of their description of