

foreign policy on an assumption that Canada can be cast as the "helpful fixer" in international affairs. That implies, among other things, a reactive rather than an active concern with world events which no longer corresponds with international realities or the Government's approach to foreign policy". (p. 8, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*)

Subsequently, in discussing policy patterns, the paper warns that "flexibility is essential but so too is a sense of direction and purpose, so that Canada's foreign policy is not over-reactive but oriented positively in the direction of national aims". (p. 32)

A. Is reaction inevitable?

52. Witnesses have questioned the paper's assumption that Canada will be able to plan its foreign policy actions in such a rational and orderly fashion as to avoid having to react to unexpected external developments. They argue that the authors of the paper have misjudged the degree to which international events are foreseeable and controllable. On this point, Professor Lalonde commented critically:

"...externally you have to react to circumstances on which you have no control. If there is pressure, if there is a war, if there is something that goes out of hand in some part of the world you have to react and this is not necessarily in line with your basic needs or basic problems internally". (9:26)

53. Professor Holsti in his testimony turned the argument of the policy paper against itself. With "no new initiatives and no new ideas" proposed in the area of peace and security, he said, Canada would be obliged to "react" and "go along" in this field.

"I find it rather disturbing for example that the discussion on SALT talks, Eastern Europe and disarmament focusses entirely on procedures;...I see no evidence whatsoever that...any independent Canadian position will be developed. The whole tone in many of these areas in Western Europe on peace and security is one of reaction rather than action and attempts at control" (7:11)

54. It is apparent that the Government hoped and expected that the new focus on national objectives and the emphasis on explicit priorities would permit a more planned, rational foreign policy and that the Government would accordingly be able "to avoid...too much improvisation" as Mr. Sharp put it in his press conference. However, the Minister himself has admitted that "forecasting is perhaps more difficult in this field than any other" (1:8).

55. The Committee questions how far a power such as Canada, with limited possibilities for policy initiatives, can successfully plan its foreign policy. It may have been unwise to criticize as much as the policy paper has, the inappropriateness of "reactive" policies. In foreign affairs it is inevitable that there will have to be reaction to unexpected developments or crises. No degree of con-

centration on national aims can immunize Canada from their effects in an increasingly interdependent world. What is more important in the Committee's opinion is to ensure that Canada is prepared to react effectively and speedily and constructively when the need arises.

B. Roles and public disenchantment

56. Members of the Committee and certain witnesses have had difficulty in interpreting exactly what is meant by "the helpful fixer" reference. What aspect of foreign policy did the "helpful fixer" role refer to? Primarily Canada's peacekeeping and mediating activities? What period of time was being referred to in the assertion that over-emphasis on role and influence obscured objectives and interests and resulted in "public disenchantment"? What objectives and interests were obscured?

57. In undertaking the policy review, the Government must have made a detailed assessment of previous policies, and considerable discussion undoubtedly centred around this section which serves as a point of departure for the new perspective. It would have been useful had there been more attempt to justify the assertions in this section. Professor Lalonde expressed his view:

"...we cannot help being astonished by the absence of historical perspective. However necessary the revision undertaken in Canada may have been, and there is an attempt to justify it in the first chapter of this booklet, I think it would have been proper to briefly state the main line of Canadian foreign policy until that date" (9:12)

58. In Committee, an official of the Department of External Affairs, (Mr. Murray) asked to clarify some of the difficulties, said the expression "public disenchantment" was meant to apply to the mid-sixties or late sixties rather than the nineteen fifties (2:14) and gave, as an example of Canadian policies which caused disenchantment, those relating to Vietnam "about 1966" (2:9).

59. The Committee is inclined to agree that there may have been some "public disenchantment" with the rather ritualistic character of some Canadian statements at the time and the defence of "quiet diplomacy" which was sometimes seen as an excuse for doing nothing. It accepts that public expectations may have developed to a point where there were found to be disappointments because they were incapable of attainment, but the Committee doubts whether the interested public rejected—as the policy paper suggest—a genuine mediatory role where Canada's position and authority equipped it to play such a role and where the parties involved were willing to see Canada involved.

60. Speaking before the press in June 1970, Mr. Sharp set out his views of "roles" in foreign policy:

"... the purpose of foreign policy is not to find a role for Canada, it isn't to decide whether we're going to be the intermediaries between the Americans and the