

cooperation came into question, the CSCE should have the political machinery for crisis management.

Canada's goals for the Prague Council were to:

- confirm the comprehensive mandate of the CSCE (i.e., no "farming out");
- enable the CSCE to deal more effectively with conflict by expanding the menu of tools available to the Council and the CSO, including CSCE peacekeeping;
- rationalize the CSCE's structure and improve its cost-effectiveness; and
- ensure the CSCE's continuing comprehensive membership by welcoming all new governments in the region. (i.e. *C. Arino*)

A major item on the Ministers' agenda was consideration of the "Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Procedures," a series of recommendations prepared by the CSO that dealt mainly with improving the CSCE's capability to deal with crises and to prevent and resolve conflicts. The Council adopted the Document and annexed it to its conclusions. Inter alia, the Prague Document agreed that the CSO would meet more regularly, at least every three months, and noted that the CSO could delegate tasks to other CSCE institutions or ad hoc groups of participating states. The persistence of the Canadian and other "maximalist" delegations paid off in the way in which the Prague Document enhanced CPC functions: the Consultative Committee would serve as a forum wherein participating states would "conduct comprehensive and regular consultations on security issues with politico-military implications"; it would also serve as a forum "for consultation and cooperation in conflict prevention and for cooperation in the implementation of decisions on crisis management taken by the Council or by the CSO acting as its agent." In addition, the Consultative Committee could draw a situation to the attention of the CSO, which could then convene to address the issue.

The Consultative Committee was empowered to initiate and, with CPC assistance, execute, fact-finding and monitor missions in connection with Paragraph 17 of the Vienna Document 1990 (unusual military activities). Also, in addition to existing support to implementation of CSBMs, the CPC was empowered to "fulfil other functions as regards the implementation and verification of agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control," if so requested by the parties to those agreements and agreed upon by the Consultative Committee. These were both items that Canada had worked for.

Looking ahead to further development of the CSCE's conflict prevention and management capability, Ministers requested the FUM to study possibilities for improving fact-finding and rapporteur missions, monitor missions, good offices, counselling and conciliation, and dispute settlement. They also, further to the efforts of Canada and "Friends," requested the FUM to "give careful consideration to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping or a CSCE role in peacekeeping" -- an ambiguity that masked differences between those who thought the CSCE should be able in its own right to call upon peacekeeping resources, and those who believed it should remit this role to others with the necessary assets, i.e. NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).

In the human dimension, the Prague Document changed the name of the Office for Free Elections to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and gave it additional functions. These included organizing regular meetings to address the implementation of CSCE human dimension commitments and carrying out tasks in