precision to enable the battle group to operate as one..."[15]

Because the impact of new technologies has not clearly resulted in paradigm shifts which have altogether rendered obsolete core competencies of major powers, it may be more useful, as Andrew Marshall of the U.S. Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment does, to speak about a "potential" or "emerging" RMA "a hypothesis about major change taking place in the period ahead, the next couple of decades."[16] At the same time many of the new technologies associated with the RMA are evolving at a "gradual rate," and "their sum total, when combined to form an integrated military force...could still prove revolutionary."[17]

The present RMA does encompass certain new technologies that have evolved from previous ones. Indeed, it is "the culmination in modern military organizations of a variety of developments, some of them dating back decades."[18] But "rapid, violent, and, above all, unpredictable change" has happened before and may yet happen with the RMA.[19]

Stephen Biddle, in a lengthy analysis and critique of current claims that an RMA has already fundamentally altered the nature of war, also argues that the new technologies have yet to prove themselves. He points to the Gulf War noting that the new technologies employed would have been far less effective against a more skilled adversary which did not make so many errors as did the Iraqi forces. But Biddle also questions whether a fundamental revolution is going to take place. "A non-RMA projection, calling for a future of only incremental change is more consistent with the facts."[20]

For Biddle, the key is not so much technology but the ability to skillfully use it. It was Germany's emphasis during the inter-war years upon training, education, and adaptation which made its use of tank warfare so effective in the early days of the Second World War. He acknowledges that war has become more complex since 1900 and that those unable to "cope with this ever-increasing complexity have been exposed to the increasing lethality of modern weapons and have suffered increasingly severe consequences." Those that have, however, found ways to manage, have been much less exposed:

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[15] *Ibid*, p. 77-9.

[16] *Ibid*, p. 20.

[17] Michael O'Hanlon, "Can Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?" *Foreign Policy* (113) (Winter 1998-99), p. 79.

[18] Cohen, "A Revolution In Warfare,". p. 41.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[20] Stephen Biddle, "Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," *Security Studies* (8) (Autumn 1998), p. 4.