was estimated by Western analysts that combat potential might be reduced by as much as 20-25% in Eastern Europe, and by 18% on the Central Front.<sup>81</sup> More significantly, operational manoeuvre groups (OMGs), which were long viewed as one of the most threatening and offensive aspects of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, appeared to have been dissolved. Of the six tank divisions disbanded because of the December announcement, five apparently belonged to the OMGs.<sup>82</sup>

Defensive restructuring is also taking place in other areas. Training and military exercises are said to have been revised towards a more defensive orientation.<sup>83</sup> The military budget is also to be reduced by 14.2% and arms production and military hardware by 19.5%.<sup>84</sup> Tank production has already decreased by 40%.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>82</sup> D.T. Yazov, "*TASS* Interview" 19 June 1989, p. 120; Phillip Karber, "Soviet Implementation Of The Gorbachev Unilateral Military Reductions: Implications For Conventional Arms Control In Europe", testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 14 March 1989, p. 13.

<sup>83</sup> See for example the interview with Col. Gen. M. Burlakov: "S novykh usloviyakh" (In New Conditions), Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 April 1989, p. 2, and Maj. Gen. I. Vorob'yev, "Podvizhnaya, mobil'naya, manevrennaya..." ("Mobile, active, manoeuvre..."), Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 September 1989, p. 2, on defense at the tactical level.

<sup>84</sup> Yazov, "Based on Principles of Realism", p. 1.

<sup>85</sup> "Soviet Military Budget, Military Costs And Arms Control", Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, 21 July 1989, Testimony of Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev (Federal News Service, 1989), pp. 17-19, 21-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Karber and Arner, "The Gorbachev Unilateral Reductions"; "Statement of Edward L. Warner III", House Armed Services Committee, 13 September 1989, pp. 3-6. (See Warner, pp. 5-6 on the estimates of combat potential.) The main area of remaining ambiguity was with artillery. Western analysts could not seem to account for much of the artillery which was supposed to have been reduced (in contrast to tanks, almost all of which could be accounted for), and also whether or not there would be an attempt to enhance artillery strength to compensate for the reduction in combat capability. See: Warner, p. 5, and, Karber and Arner. More recently, there have been concerns expressed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency that large supplies of fuel and ammunition continue to be maintained in Eastern Europe. Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Still Stocking Ammunition, U.S. Says", *New York Times*, 11 January 1990, p. A15.