

ious sorts of cognitive processes. These processes are actively involved in both creating the "problem" in the first place – misperception – and in executing the instrumentally rational intention and technique. This potentially antithetical relationship (between rational intention and technique and non-rational problem) built into the casual logic of Confidence-Building thinking may help to explain why the existing accounts of how Confidence-Building works seem so naive, particularly when contrasted with the findings of contemporary cognitive psychology.

There are several points worth reiterating by way of a brief conclusion. What I have tried to show in this preliminary study is that (1) the concept of Confidence-Building possesses great intrinsic imprecision (the first six chapters of the study provide a graphic illustration of this); (2) the roots of that imprecision are to be found in the predominantly substantive Eurocentric origins of most Confidence-Building thinking (primarily the tendency to "rope together" a disparate collection of substantive "solutions" to defence policy problems under the rubric of Confidence-Building); and (3) the Eurocentric basis for most Confidence-Building thinking is seriously flawed in terms of (a) its assumptions about the intentions and the capabilities of NATO and the WTO and (b) naïve assumptions about the psychological (cognitive) dynamics of Confidence-Building. This all has a profound impact on the potential for Confidence-Building to contribute constructively within the larger framework of arms control. Although existing CBM proposals can be pursued to address specific (predominantly Western) policy problems related to (predominantly) surprise attack concerns in Central Europe, the possibility of generating unintended outcomes – or simply failing to produce any real CBMs at all – will remain great as long as the conceptual underpinnings of the concept remain faulty. Further analytical work must address these conceptual problems.

