

be taken within the limits fixed by previous resolutions and decisions of the United Nations which until we alter them—if we have the power to alter them, as Assembly decisions—remain in effect. His report emphasizes, I think rightly, that actions through the recommendations of this Assembly, as contrasted with decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, require for their implementation the consent of the parties concerned.

The main argument of the Secretary-General's report is that we must return to the Armistice Agreement—to the full implementation of the Armistice Agreement—but that this should be joined with United Nations action to secure and supervise such implementation, something that had been absent in recent years, and that if we cannot take that kind of complementary action for implementation the mere injunction on the parties concerned to observe the armistice in its entirety may not prove to be very effective. The Secretary-General says in paragraph 15 of his report:

There is universal recognition that the condition of affairs, of which this deterioration formed part, should not be permitted to return. Renewed full implementation of the clauses of the Armistice Agreement obviously presumes such an attitude on the part of the Governments concerned, and such supporting measures as would guarantee a return to the state of affairs envisaged in the Armistice Agreement, and avoidance of the state of affairs into which conditions, due to a lack of compliance with the Agreement, progressively deteriorated.

Compliance with the Armistice Agreement is, in our view, as important as compliance with recent resolutions on withdrawal, and other types of resolutions, although any effort to bring about this larger compliance should, I repeat, be subsequent to our decision on withdrawal. But that compliance, as I have said, should be with all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement—Article I as well as Articles VI, VII and VIII.

Such full implementation, supervised and secured by the United Nations, would, the Secretary-General tells us, have an important and a positive bearing on other problems in the region, and I certainly agree with that. Therefore, I venture to suggest that we might consider proceeding as follows—that we discuss and decide on a resolution reaffirming that the withdrawal of Israel forces must be complete and immediate, and regretting that this has not already taken place, and then that we should immediately discuss and decide on a recommendation which would include as its basic principle the principle that withdrawal of those forces must be followed immediately by action which would represent real progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions in the region.

And what action, in our view, is necessary to accomplish that essential result? Well, I suggest for consideration to the Assembly that certain ideas might be worthy of inclusion in any resolution which we may be discussing. I think that the two parties concerned, Egypt and Israel, should be called upon by this Assembly scrupulously to observe all the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement and to refrain from all acts of hostility, including the exercise by either party of any claim to belligerent rights. I think that the Secretary-General might be instructed, after consultation with the parties concerned, to make arrangements for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on both sides of the armistice demarcation line and in the Gaza strip in order that that Force, which is our own creation and which is functioning so effectively in the interest of peace and security already, might assume the supervisory duties of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and prevent incursions and raids across the demarcation line and maintain peaceful conditions along that line, and that Egypt and Israel, to assist in this essential work of the United Nations Force, should be requested to remove their military forces from or limit them in these areas of deployment which remain to be delimited.

I think that the United Nations should be associated with steps to replace the present civil administration of the Gaza strip and to ensure that that area will not in the future be used as a base or as a target for raids or retaliation. I believe that it would be wise to take appropriate steps to determine the legal position of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, but that, pending that determination, the parties should be called upon to give assurances that they will not assert or exercise any belligerent rights in those waters or interfere with freedom of navigation in them.

Then I think that the Secretary-General, on whom we seem to be placing great burdens or responsibility these days, should be authorized to arrange for units, or a unit, of the United Nations Emergency Force, after the withdrawal of Israel forces,