The application of the moratorium of August 3rd delayed the compulsory payments of these bills, of which the acceptors were the innocent holders.

But to put a stay on the wild clamor for gold, the Government subsequently extended the moratorium to include almost every kind of obligation entered into prior to August 4th, with the exception of wages, and salaries, British Government obligations, liabilities on bank notes, payment of old-age pensions, etc. Under this larger moratorium the banks were also protected, though as a matter of fact the moratorium, as it affected those institutions, was granted only after an undertaking had been made that its powers would be exercised by the banks in a manner arranged between them and the Government.

At the same time bank notes were allotted to the banks in denominations of one pound and ten shillings certificates up to 20% of their deposit liabilities. This effectually put a stop to the hoarding of gold.

But the Government adopted a much greater remedial measure. We give the graphic account of that action by the London correspondent of The Evening Post:

"Confronted as this market was, for the first time in history, with an absolute embargo on international remittances, with a closed stock exchange, with a postponement by Government decree of maturities on Lombard Street indebtedness, and with cash payments made to an extent in a false currency, the meaning of the Government's extraordinarily bold step of Wednesday, August 12, must be discussed in the light of those conditions. The remedial measures, such as the general moratorium, and the allotting to the banks of Government notes of £1 and 10s. each (up to 20 per cent. of the banker's liability on deposits), had been completely successful.

"But it soon became evident that in spite of these satisfactory aspects of the situation, a great deadlock existed in the money market. The interruption of remittances from the Continent, plus the effect of the moratorium on bills of exchange, tied up something like £400,000,000 of foreign bills in the London money market. With their private resources locked up in these as tightly as a German fleet in a German harbor, not only were bankers and discount houses embarrassed, but it was manifestly impossible to negotiate fresh business even of the most legitimate character.

"Then, on the evening of August 12, came the dramatic announcement of the Treasury. It was that the Bank of England would discount any approved bill of exchange accepted by its holder before August 4, that on their maturity such bills would still be carried by the bank at 2 per cent. over the bank rate, 'without recourse to such holder,' and that the Government had agreed 'to guarantee the Bank of England from any loss it may incur in discounting bills of exchange either home or foreign, bank or trade, accepted prior to August 4.'

"To say that when this announcement became known late on Wednesday it staggered the discount market, is certainly no exaggeration. It clearly meant that the Government was prepared to shoulder the whole of the final responsibility for bills of exchange not covered by remittances, so far as ante-moratorium bills were concerned. Whether the Government was wise in inserting the clause, 'without recourse to the holder,' is rather difficult to say. It was at once perceived that the result of the insertion of that clause would be to occasion every one to rush with his ante-moratorium bills to the bank to escape any further liability.

"That expectation has been amply fulfilled, and during the past few days the Bank of England has simply been inundated with such bills. The mere physical task of caring for them completely swamped the bank's facilities, on three successive days. On the 20th, the bank's weekly statement reflected this enormous re-discounting process in

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